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Two relatively independent research traditions have developed that address emotion
management. The first is the emotion regulation (ER) tradition, which focuses on the
processes which permit individuals to influence which emotions they have, when they
have them, and how they experience and express these emotions. The second is the
emotional intelligence (EI) tradition, which focuses—among other things—on individual
differences in ER. To integrate these two traditions, we employed the process model
of ER (Gross, 1998b) to review the literature on EI. Two key findings emerged. First,
high EI individuals shape their emotions from the earliest possible point in the emotion
trajectory and have many strategies at their disposal. Second, high EI individuals regulate
their emotions successfully when necessary but they do so flexibly, thereby leaving room
for emotions to emerge. We argue that ER and EI traditions stand to benefit substantially
from greater integration.
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INTRODUCTION
Contemporary accounts of emotions emphasize the important
role they play in adaptation (e.g., Cosmides and Tooby, 2000).
Numerous studies support this view, showing that emotions facil-
itate adaptation by optimizing sensory intake (Susskind et al.,
2008; Vermeulen et al., 2009), improving detection of threaten-
ing stimuli (e.g., Ohman et al., 2001; Williams et al., 2004; Pessoa
et al., 2005), readying behavioral responses (e.g., Frijda, 1987;
Roseman et al., 1994), assisting decisionmaking (Damasio, 1994),
enhancing memory for important events (Phelps, 2006; Luminet
and Curci, 2009), and guiding interpersonal interactions (Keltner
and Kring, 1998).
It is also evident, however, that emotions are by no means
always helpful (e.g., Salovey and Mayer, 1990; Parrott, 1993;
Gruber et al., 2011). Indeed, emotions can at times lead us to do
very unhelpful things. This is the case, for instance, when anger
toward a stubborn administrator only worsens our situation, or
when excitement leads us to buy a house that we cannot afford.
Emotions may thus be said to be maladaptive when they are of
the wrong type, when they come at the wrong time, or when they
occur at the wrong intensity level. At such times, we often try to
regulate our emotions (Gross, 1998b).
Because our emotions are crucial determinants of how well we
function in everyday life, researchers from different perspectives
have energetically sought to understand how emotions best can
be managed for optimal functioning. In this article, we focus on
two relatively independent research traditions that have examined
this question. The first is the emotion regulation (ER) tradition,
which has mainly focused on how a person can effectively manage
his/her emotions. The second is the emotional intelligence (EI)
tradition, which has focused—among other things—on under-
standing who makes the most of his/her emotions. Thus far, the
ER literature principally has been concerned with basic processes,
and only recently has begun to place more emphasis on individual
differences. Conversely, the EI literature principally has been con-
cerned with individual differences, and only recently has begun to
focus on basic processes. The present paper constitutes an attempt
to bring these two traditions together in the hopes that they
will both inform and benefit from each other. This effort draws
upon prior contributions by Barrett and Gross (2001), Barrett
and Salovey (2002), and Matthews et al. (2002), who have all
underlined the necessity for the science of emotional intelligence
to integrate knowledge acquired in other areas of the affective
sciences. This effort is predicated on the belief that EI research
can reciprocally inform and complement fundamental research
traditions such as ER, first by calling attention to the differences
among individuals and second, by emphasizing the consequences
of such differences in real life settings (e.g., at work, in education,
in marital relationships).
THE EMOTION REGULATION (ER) TRADITION
Emotion regulation refers to the processes by which individuals
modify the trajectory of one or more component(s) of an emo-
tional response. Emotion regulation can thus serve to influence
the type (i.e., which emotion one has), intensity (i.e., how intense
the emotion is), time course (i.e., when the emotion starts and
how long it lasts), and quality (i.e., how the emotion is expe-
rienced or expressed) of the emotion. Such regulation may be
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automatic or effortful, conscious or unconscious (Mauss et al.,
2006). It occurs every time one (consciously or unconsciously)
activates the goal to influence the emotion-generative process
(Gross et al., 2011).
Emotion regulation may be intrinsic/intrapersonal (regulating
one’s own emotions) or extrinsic/interpersonal (regulating some-
one else’s emotions) (Gross and Jazaieri, 2014). In this paper, we
will focus on intrapersonal emotion regulation. Although people
typically try to decrease the experiential and/or behavioral aspects
of negative emotions (Gross et al., 2006), positive emotions are
also down-regulated. This is the case when we try to look less
happy than we are when we have passed a difficult exam that a
friend has failed, when we try to decrease feelings of attraction for
a colleague who is married, or when we try to avoid laughing at
an inappropriate moment (Giuliani et al., 2008). It is important
to note that emotion regulation needn’t involve down-regulation.
It can also involve maintaining or increasing emotion, as when
we maintain enthusiasm in order to achieve a long and difficult
task, increase the expression of sadness at a funeral or increase
our amusement at a colleague’s supposedly funny joke.
The emotion regulation tradition aims to understand the myr-
iad ways individuals regulate their emotions. One critical part
of the study of ER has been the conceptual analysis of emotion
regulation strategies and the development of a model to orga-
nize them. Before presenting this model, it is noteworthy that
the ER tradition has learned to avoid classifying ER strategies as
a priori adaptive or maladaptive. An emotion regulation strat-
egy is said to be contextually adaptive if the resulting emotion
meets the regulator’s goals, regardless of social norms or long-
term adaptive value (Thompson and Calkins, 1996; Gross and
Thompson, 2007). If the goal of a boss is to have his subor-
dinates work overtime, his anger up-regulation process will be
deemed successful if it results in increased anger and if his sub-
ordinates work overtime. The same emotion-regulation strategy
can thus be adaptive or maladaptive, depending on the specific
individual, the emotion, its intensity, and the context (Bonanno
et al., 2004; Sheppes et al., 2011; Aldao and Nolen-Hoeksema,
2012). According to the ER tradition, the adaptive nature of a
given emotion-regulation episode is the product of three fac-
tors: awareness, goals, and strategies (Gross and Jazaieri, 2014).
The awareness of one’s emotion and the context in which it
occurs makes it possible to determine whether or not the emo-
tion should be regulated (which creates space for flexibility),
and to access knowledge about how to do so (Barrett et al.,
2001; Farb et al., 2014). The emotion-regulation goal determines
whether emotion experience, expression, or physiology must be
increased, maintained or decreased in duration and/or inten-
sity. Once the emotion-regulation goal has specified the ends,
emotion-regulation strategies specify the means which can be
more or less efficient to reach the goal (Gross and Jazaieri,
2014).
The process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998b) pro-
vides a framework for classifying emotion regulation processes
regardless of their potential (mal)adaptive value. This model cat-
egorizes strategies according to the point at which they have their
primary impact in the emotion generative process. During the
milliseconds and seconds following the occurrence of a poten-
tially emotion-eliciting situation (micro-level), there are five
points in time at which individuals might intervene in order to
modify their emotion trajectory. These points represent five fam-
ilies of emotion regulation strategies (see Figure 1). Although
sequential at the micro-level, these strategies can be used in paral-
lel or in any order at the macro-level (i.e., at the level of minutes,
hours, or days following the emotional situation). Put differently,
if the emotion trajectory was not altered or if the emotion was ill-
regulated at the micro-level, one can still regulate it later by using
any of the five families of strategies.
SITUATION SELECTION
Situation selection involves choosing or avoiding some activities,
people or places as a function of their expected emotional impact.
It is placed at the left-most point in Figure 1 because it affects the
situation to which a person is exposed, and thus shapes the emo-
tion trajectory at the earliest possible point. Adaptive situation
selection involves knowing oneself and one’s needs, forecasting
the emotions that various situations are expected to produce
(which is not as simple as it may sound; Wilson and Gilbert,
2005), and taking these emotions into account when select-
ing the situations to which one will be exposed (Loewenstein,
2007; Gross, 2008). Naturally, the costs and benefits in the short
and long term must be carefully weighed before making the
choice. Two situation selection strategies are confrontation and
avoidance.
Confrontation involves choosing to face a situation in spite of
the negative emotions it might potentially elicit. This strategy is
particularly efficient if the situation is likely to bring long-term
benefits. Speaking in public often induces negative emotions in
the short term, but avoiding oral presentations in front of one’s
team might turn counterproductive for future promotions. Two
meta-analyses indeed confirm that while confrontation often pro-
duces negative emotion in the short-term, it is an efficient strategy
to maximize long-term happiness and mental health (Suls and
Fletcher, 1985; Aldao et al., 2010).
Avoidance refers to the escape of the situation as a whole. If a
situation is unlikely to bring future benefits and if there are no
avoidance-related side effects (or if a situation has more detri-
mental than beneficial effects), then avoidance is often the best
strategy. In the other cases, avoidance is likely to become dys-
functional. Research has shown that the chronic use of avoidance
is associated with poor indicators of long-term well-being and
health (see Suls and Fletcher, 1985; Penley et al., 2002; Aldao et al.,
2010 for meta-analyses and reviews).
Although situation selection may be an efficient strategy, one
cannot always avoid negative situations/emotions. The families of
ER strategies presented next are useful in three main situations:
(1) situations that are expected to induce negative emotions but
that cannot be avoided due to positive long-term benefits, (2)
unexpected situations that cause an unwanted emotion, and (3)
situations that induce a conditioned negative emotion.
SITUATION MODIFICATION
Situation modification, shown in Figure 1, encompasses the
strategies aimed at modifying the situation so as to alter
its emotional impact. Three strategies have received special
attention: direct situation modification, support-seeking, and
conflict resolution.
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FIGURE 1 | The process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998b, 2014).
Direct situation modification (also called problem-focused
coping in the stress tradition; Folkman and Lazarus, 1980)
involves taking practical actions that impact directly on the sit-
uation (e.g., fixing the broken printer; rehearsing one’s presenta-
tion). This strategy is usually associated with increased well-being
and less psychological disorders (see Aldao et al., 2010 for a meta-
analysis) as well as better health outcomes (see Penley et al., 2002
for a meta-analysis).
Help/support-seeking involves seeking others’ assistance in
modifying the situation (e.g., asking a classmate for some help
in order to finish homework by the deadline or seeking the help
of a counselor to deal with a difficult child). Although there are
situations in which instrumental benefits come at a certain psy-
chological cost (Nadler, 1991), the ability to seek—and obtain—
help from others has long been judged adaptive by clinical and
educational psychologists (Wills, 1987; Newman, 1994).
Conflict resolution involves taking steps to modify (defuse) a
conflict situation (e.g., the conflict that my husband and I are hav-
ing concerning whether to send our daughter to boarding school).
While many different strategies can be used (Wall and Callister,
1995), they are not all efficient in reducing conflict (Deutsch
et al., 2011). Moreover, while some techniques make it possi-
ble to achieve one’s ends (e.g., I won: my daughter will stay at
home), they can be unsuccessful at addressing the relationship
dimensions of the conflict (my husband now agrees with my
decision but remains bitter). The opposite could also be true (I
may finally agree with my husband but be resentful). Only a few
techniques engender satisfaction with both the decision and the
relationship (Demoulin, 2014).
Although situation modification strategies make an early
impact on the emotion generation process, it is not possible to
modify every emotion-eliciting situation: one can neither prevent
a sick colleague from coughing loudly every 5min, nor easily get
rid of a tyrannical boss. Other strategies must thus be considered.
ATTENTIONAL DEPLOYMENT
Attentional deployment involves altering how we feel by selecting
the information we attend to. It comes after situation modifica-
tion in Figure 1. Existing literature has mainly focused on three
forms of attentional deployment: distraction, rumination, and
mindfulness.
Distraction involves a shift in attention, either away from the
situation altogether or away from emotional aspects of the sit-
uation. It therefore includes the physical withdrawal (such as
covering the eyes in front of a severely injured body) or the
internal redirection of attention (such as focusing on the non-
emotional aspects of the situation, or thinking about something
else). Distraction has been found to decrease negative emotions
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(see Webb et al., 2012 for a meta-analysis), especially when asso-
ciated with problem-focused coping (Shimazu and Schaufeli,
2007).
Rumination refers to a perseverative focus on thoughts and
feelings associated with a negative emotion-eliciting event. It has
been found to increase the duration and intensity of negative
emotions (Morrow and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Bushman, 2002)
and to predict the onset, number and duration of depressive
episodes over a 2.5 year follow-up of initially non-depressed indi-
viduals (Robinson and Alloy, 2003). Accordingly, this emotion
regulation strategy is highly prevalent in clinical populations (see
Aldao et al., 2010 for a meta-analysis).
Mindfulness (also called “mindful attention awareness” to
distinguish it from the ritualized practice of mindfulness med-
itation) involves purposefully paying attention to the present
moment in a non-judgmental way. It consists in observing what
is happening moment by moment in one’s internal (thoughts,
motives, emotions, bodily sensations) and external world, with-
out judging it. Numerous cross-sectional, experience-sampling,
experimental and intervention studies show that mindful atten-
tion increases happiness (Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010) and
decreases negative affects such as stress, anxiety, or depression
(Brown and Ryan, 2003; Hofmann et al., 2010). It is worth not-
ing that the balance between internal attention (what I think/feel)
and external attention (what I do) is essential. Simply focusing on
one’s emotions and sensations does not produce the same bene-
fits and can even be counter-productive (see Webb et al., 2012 for
a meta-analysis).
COGNITIVE CHANGE
Cognitive change (shown fourth in line in Figure 1) refers to
changing the way we think in order to change the way we feel. We
can either change how we think about the situation itself or about
our capacity to manage its demands. Like the other strategies,
cognitive change can be automatic or effortful. As it is difficult
to determine whether the conscious appraisal of a situation is
the spontaneous initial appraisal of the situation or the product
of an automatic reappraisal, we chose to include both appraisals
and re-appraisals in this section. The four forms of (re)appraisals
that have received the most attention are self-efficacy appraisals,
challenge/threat appraisals, positive reappraisal, and acceptance.
Self-efficacy appraisal captures an individual’s confidence that
s/he is able to deal with the situation (Bandura, 1997). Higher
levels of self-efficacy lead to both lower subjective stress and
increased cellular immunity (e.g., Wiedenfield et al., 1990).
Challenge and threat appraisals (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984;
Tomaka et al., 1997) refer to the gains and losses perceived in
an adverse situation. Threat appraisal is thought to occur when
an individual appraises a given situation as exceeding his or her
resources and/or focuses on the potential/actual losses inherent
to the situation (e.g., loss of love and security in the case of
a divorce). By contrast, challenge appraisal occurs in situations
appraised as taxing resources but in which the individual, while
recognizing the potential or actual losses—which makes it differ-
ent from unrealistic optimism—focuses on the potential or actual
gains inherent to the situation (e.g., increase in autonomy and
decrease in quarrels in the case of a divorce). Challenge appraisals
lead to less subjective stress and less hypothalamic-pituitary-
adrenal axis activation than threat appraisals (e.g., Tomaka et al.,
1993; Gaab et al., 2005).
Positive reappraisal refers to reappraising a situation or one’s
response to it in a more positive way. It may consist for instance in
looking for the silver lining in the situation, in putting things into
perspective or in reinterpreting one’s negative emotional response
as normal given the circumstances. Studies have shown that reap-
praisal strategies generally lead to a decrease in negative emotion
experience and expression (see Webb et al., 2012 for a meta-
analysis). Findings regarding its efficiency to modify physiology
are mixed (Webb et al., 2012). While some studies show that reap-
praisal decreases neuroendocrine and autonomic responses (e.g.,
Dandoy and Goldstein, 1990; Abelson et al., 2005; Jamieson et al.,
2012; Ben-Naim et al., 2013), other studies show that reappraisal
increases them (e.g., Denson et al., 2014. Alternative studies
have found that reappraisal neither increases nor decreases these
responses (e.g., Gross, 1998a). Future studies should uncover the
moderators of its effect.
Acceptance refers to accepting the situation and/or one’s inca-
pacity to deal with it. It is especially useful in situations that
cannot be easily modified or reappraised (e.g., abuse as a child;
incurable disease). The acceptance of uncontrollable negative
events and the emotions that they elicit has been found to be
protective at both psychological (decreases negative emotions)
and physical (provides immunity and decreases pain) levels (e.g.,
Burns et al., 2002; McCracken and Eccleston, 2003). This strat-
egy is not frequently used by people suffering from psychological
disorders (see Aldao et al., 2010 for a meta-analysis).
RESPONSE MODULATION
Response modulation is shown on the right side of Figure 1. As
this placement indicates, it occurs late in the emotion-generative
process, after response tendencies have developed. These strate-
gies can target the experiential (i.e., when one shares one’s emo-
tion or drinks a glass of alcohol in order to decrease feelings of
anxiety), physiological (i.e., when one smokes marijuana in order
to decrease the heart rate, or acts aggressively to defuse physical
tension), and/or behavioral (when one attempts to hides one’s
emotion from others) components of the emotional response.
Among responsemodulation forms, emotion sharing, aggression,
substance abuse, and expressive suppression have received the
most attention.
Emotion sharing refers to expressing one’s emotions in a
socially shared language (Rimé, 2007). It typically consists in
describing the emotional event that one has just experienced or
witnessed. If I just saw a pedestrian hit by a car, I will probably
call someone I know to tell him or her about it. People share emo-
tion primarily because they expect it to foster emotional recovery
(catharsis effect). Research has however shown that sharing per
se does not foster emotional recovery. Nevertheless, sharing emo-
tion is beneficial to mental health due to several indirect effects
such as the construction or reinforcement of social bonds and
the transference of affection and warmth (see Rimé, 2007 for a
review).
Verbal/physical aggression is a strategy used to reduce the
bodily tension that arises from an emotional situation (whichmay
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ormay not be related to the person targeted). Although expressing
one’s emotions is generally beneficial for both mental and phys-
ical health (e.g.,Taylor et al., 1997), a number of studies suggest
that hostility—and especially its “expressive” dimension—leads
to exaggerated cardiovascular reactivity in response to provoca-
tive stressors (Suls andWan, 1993). It also increases the possibility
of developing coronary-heart disease (see Miller et al., 1996
for a meta-analysis). Needless to say, this strategy is also very
detrimental to social relationships.
Substance use refers to exaggerated consumption of alco-
hol, drugs, or medicines in order to anesthetize thoughts, feel-
ings, and/or physiological arousal. Although moderate alcohol
consumption can have health benefits (for a review, see Baum-
Baicker, 1985), the regular use (and thus abuse) of alcohol and
drugs as a coping style is associated with poor outcomes in terms
of mental and physical health (e.g., Single et al., 2000; Teesson
et al., 2000).
Expressive suppression consists of inhibiting the behavioral
expression of unwanted emotions (e.g., hiding one’s anger).
Research has found that suppression is highly prevalent in
several psychological disorders (see Aldao et al., 2010 for a
meta-analysis). While it does decrease the observable emo-
tion, suppression rarely changes the negative emotion experience
(although it may decrease positive emotion). Moreover, it actu-
ally increases sympathetic activation of the cardiovascular system
(e.g., Gross and Levenson, 1993, 1997; Gross, 1998a; Harris,
2001; Demaree et al., 2006; see Webb et al., 2012 for a meta-
analysis). This may explain why expressive suppression decreases
well-being (Gross and John, 2003) and increases vulnerabil-
ity to cardiovascular diseases (see Mauss and Gross, 2004 for
review).
Finally, it is worth noting that although it has received lit-
tle attention, physical exercise can also be used as an emotion
regulation strategy.
THE EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE (EI) TRADITION
A second tradition that has examined emotionmanagement is the
EI tradition. This tradition places emphasis on individual differ-
ences rather than on basic processes. It argues that the various
instances of emotion regulation are not totally independent of
one another within a given individual. On the contrary, individ-
uals show some consistency in their regulation habits (i.e., when,
how and which emotion component they regulate). Each indi-
vidual can thus be characterized by a certain emotion regulation
style, which contributes tomake him/her predictable in the eyes of
others and also carries certain consequences for long-term adap-
tation (e.g., Bar-On, 1997; Mayer and Salovey, 1997; Gross and
John, 2003).
The emotional intelligence (EI) tradition aims to provide
a scientific framework for studying individual differences with
regard to how individuals identify, understand, express, regu-
late, and use their own emotions and those of others (Mayer
and Salovey, 1997; Petrides and Furnham, 2003; Brasseur et al.,
2013). One critical part of the study of EI has been the anal-
ysis of individual differences in emotion regulation (Akerjordet
and Severinsson, 2007; Roberts et al., 2007). Regardless of the EI
model or measure, people scoring high on EI tests are assumed
to regulate their emotions better than people scoring low on EI
tests.
INTELLIGENT EMOTION REGULATION
The emotional intelligence tradition is outcome-oriented rather
than process-oriented in the sense that it seeks to capture the
outcome of emotion regulation. Individuals are said to display
intelligent emotion regulation if they are able to use emotion
regulation in a flexible manner and in a way that is consistent
with their goals and thus adaptive (Mayer and Salovey, 1995;
Bar-On et al., 2003; Mayer et al., 2008). Put differently, emo-
tionally intelligent individuals are those who carefully review the
context before deciding whether and how they should regulate
their emotion. These individuals take into account and maximize
intra-individual and inter-individual long-term survival and wel-
fare. For instance, a boss who up-regulates his anger in order to
have his subordinates work overtime will be said to be manip-
ulative but not emotionally intelligent because his emotional
behavior will most likely impair his social adaptation in the long-
term and lead his subordinates to burn-out. Another feature of
emotionally intelligent regulation is that it takes into account the
emotional display rules of the culture in which one lives.
In accordance with this adaptation-oriented view, EI has
been associated with indicators of superior adaptation in many
domains of life. Examples of this are higher life satisfaction (e.g.,
Petrides et al., 2007b; Di Fabio and Saklofske, 2014b), better
health, both objectively measured (Mikolajczak et al., in press)
and subjectively reported (see Schutte et al., 2007; Martins
et al., 2010 for a meta-analyses), increased social support (e.g.,
Mikolajczak et al., 2007a), better quality of social andmarital rela-
tionships (e.g., Schutte et al., 2001a; Lopes et al., 2004; Petrides
et al., 2006b; Malouff et al., 2014), and enhanced academic and
work performance (see Van Rooy and Viswesvaran, 2004; O’Boyle
et al., 2011 for a meta-analysis).
EI: TRAIT AND ABILITY PERSPECTIVES
Is EI a form of intelligence as has been suggested by authors
such as Salovey and Mayer (1990) or is it a constellation of
emotion-related traits as authors like Petrides and Furnham
(2003) argue? Is it best measured using intelligence-like tests or
using personality-like questionnaires? After nearly two decades
of debate on the status of EI as intelligence or trait, a tripartite
model of EI has been proposed to reconcile these perspectives (see
Mikolajczak et al., 2009b).
This model posits three levels of EI: knowledge, abilities, and
traits. The knowledge level refers to what people know about
emotions and emotional competencies (e.g., Do I know how to
express my emotions constructively?). The ability level refers to
the capability to apply this knowledge in an emotional situation
(e.g.,Am I able to express my emotions constructively?). The focus
here is not on what people know but rather on what they do. For
instance, even though people know that they should not shout
when angry, many are simply unable to refrain from doing so.
The trait level refers to emotion-related dispositions, namely, the
propensity to behave in a certain way in emotional situations (Do
I typically express my emotions in a constructive manner?). The
focus here is not on what people know or on what they are able
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to do, but on what they typically do. For instance, some indi-
viduals might be able to express their emotions constructively
if explicitly asked to do so, but they would be unable to do this
spontaneously. These three levels of EI are loosely connected.
Knowledge does not always translate into ability, and ability does
not always translate into typical behavior. These three levels of
EI are therefore assessed using different instruments. Knowledge
and ability are assessed using intelligence-like tests such as the
MSCEIT1, the STEU2, or the GERT3while usual emotional behav-
ior is usually assessed using personality-like questionnaires such
as the TEIQUE4, the EQ-I5 or, more recently, the PEC6.
Davis and Humphrey (2012) confirmed the construct dif-
ferentiation and complementary theoretical conceptualizations
between ability and trait EI. The findings from a large sample of
adolescents revealed that the two measures of EI were only weakly
associated. Moreover, each measure showed the expected pattern
of associations with personality dimensions (to which trait EI was
more robustly associated than ability EI) and general cognitive
ability GCA (to which ability EI was more strongly linked than
trait EI).
The enthusiasm for the study of emotional intelligence stems
in part from its practical implications. Outcomes as different
as professional success, well-being, social adjustment, and mar-
ital satisfaction could be associated and viewed in a new light.
Emotional intelligence indeed predicts a significant portion of
variance in these outcomes (see, e.g., O’Boyle et al., 2011 regard-
ing work performance, Schutte et al., 2007 regarding mental
health; Mikolajczak et al., in press, for physical health, and
Malouff et al., 2014 for marital satisfaction). Partly characteriz-
ing these differences as a function of individual differences in
emotion regulation processes contributes to explaining—and not
simply predicting—these social, health, educational, and occupa-
tional outcomes. It also allows researchers and practitioners to
identify new avenues for intervention.
INTEGRATING EMOTION REGULATION AND EMOTIONAL
INTELLIGENCE TRADITIONS
The ER and EI traditions each capture an important aspect of
emotion management. Although the ER tradition has shed light
on basic emotion regulation processes, it has not placed empha-
sis on individual differences in these processes. By contrast, the
EI tradition has documented the consequences of individual dif-
ferences in emotion regulation on social, health, educational,
and occupational outcomes. However, until recently, EI did not
primarily focus on the processes generating these individual dif-
ferences in emotion regulation efficiency. The reason for this is
historical: the success of EI in organizational settings has led
most EI researchers to focus on the development of measures to
improve the quality of EI predictions, rather than on underlying
processes.
1Mayer Salovey Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (Mayer et al., 2002).
2Situational Test of Emotional Understanding (MacCann and Roberts, 2008).
3Geneva Emotion Recognition Test (Schlegel et al., 2014).
4Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire (Petrides, 2009).
5Emotional Quotient Inventory (Bar-On, 2004).
6Profile of Emotional Competence (Brasseur et al., 2013).
Our goal in this article is to provide a conceptual map and a
review of findings useful to anyone interested in individual dif-
ferences in emotion regulation processes. In the next section, we
will use the process model of emotion regulation described above
to organize our review of EI findings in emotion regulation. In
each sub-section, the studies reviewed have been meta-analyzed
in order to provide an estimate of the effect size reported in the
Tables 2, 3 (for trait and ability EI, respectively). Two comple-
mentary points must be outlined from the outset. First, due to
the paucity of EI research in childhood, we have focused on adult
literature. Second, several constructs (e.g., social intelligence,
alexithymia) have frequently been described as quasi measures of
EI. However, as there is a distinction between EI and other related
constructs (Van Rooy and Viswesvaran, 2004), the current review
only includes studies that use measures that specifically refer to
measuring “emotional intelligence.”
METHOD
Literature search
Relevant studies published until October 2014 were identi-
fied using Scopus, PsycINFO, and Pubmed online databases. A
combination of the following key words was used: emotional
intelligence, emotion regulation, situation selection, situation
modification, attention deployment, cognitive change, response
modulation, avoidance, forecasting, coping, conflict resolution,
problem solving, support seeking, distraction, concentration,
rumination,mindfulness, mindwandering, threat appraisal, chal-
lenge appraisal, self-efficacy, reappraisal, acceptance, surface act-
ing, suppression, substance use, self-harm. We also wrote to 12
authors of relevant articles and asked for information about
unpublished studies between EI and ER (coping). Sixty seven
percent of these authors replied but 75% of them did not have
unpublished data. We identified four more studies using this
method.
Inclusion criteria
Studies were included in the review if they met the following
criteria:
1. The study presented a correlation between Emotional intel-
ligence (EI) and (at least) one Emotion Regulation (ER)
strategy.
2. The sample was constituted of adults.
3. The article was written in English.
4. The sample was constituted of healthy individuals.
Articles were not included if only one subscale of an EI instru-
ment was used (e.g., Gohm and Clore, 2002; Salovey et al., 2002).
Additionally, nine studies were not included because we failed
to obtain the necessary information from the authors (Pellitteri,
2002; Bond and Donaldson-feilder, 2004; Morrison, 2008; Deniz
et al., 2009; Chow, 2011; Frewen et al., 2012; Gawali, 2012; Gooty
et al., 2014; Hen and Goroshit, 2014).
Another study was excluded from the meta-analysis because of
its unrealistic effect size (Animasahun, 2008 reported a correla-
tion of 0.955 between EI and conflict resolution behavior).
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Coding studies
The studies were coded with respect to the sample characteristics,
the family of emotion regulation strategy based on Gross’s process
model (i.e., situation selection, situationmodification, attentional
deployment, cognitive change, and response modulation), the
specific ER strategy used, the type of emotional intelligence mea-
sure used (ability or trait), the emotional intelligence scale, and
the statistical information required to compute the effect size and
confidence interval. One researcher coded the relevant articles (A.
P.) and another one (M.M.) checked the coding. The two coders
settled any disagreement by consensus. A total of 90 studies were
coded to produce 200 effect sizes based on 23,174 participants.
Twenty five of the effect sizes refer to the situation selection family,
57 effect sizes to the situationmodification family, 21 to the atten-
tion deployment family, 51 to the cognitive change family, and
46 to the response modulation family. Results are summarized in
Table 1.
Statistical analyses
Each study provided us with a measure of association between
EI and (at least) one ER strategy. The effect size of EI on this
strategy was expressed in Pearson’s r in the papers and we there-
fore computed all the individual confidence intervals around r.
In order to compute these confidence intervals, Fisher’s r-to-z′
transformation was used. First, r was converted to z′. Second, the
confidence intervals were computed in terms of z′. Taking into
account that the z for a 95% confidence interval (Z0.95) is 1.96 and
that the standard error is calculated by the formula 1/
√
N − 3,
the lower limit confidence interval was computed by the next for-
mula: lower limit z′ = z′ − (1.96) (standard error). Regarding the
upper limit confidence interval, the used formula was this: upper
limit z′ = z′ + (1.96)(standard error). Finally, these confidence
intervals (computed in terms of z′) were then back-transformed
to r getting the confidence intervals in terms of r. As readers are
usually more familiar with effect sizes expressed in Cohen’s “d”
(whose interpretation is facilitated by Cohen’s norms), each effect
size “r” was then converted into “d.” The formula for convert-
ing between r and d were taken from Rosenthal (1994, p. 239). In
a third step, we aggregated the relevant individual effect sizes to
obtain the aggregate effect size of EI on each ER family. When sev-
eral effects of a given family came from the same study, they were
first aggregated and this aggregated effect size was then aggregated
with the effect sizes of the other studies. In order to give more
weight to the effect sizes coming from studies with larger sam-
ples, we used the methods suggested by Lipsy and Wilson (2000):
The “Inverse Variance Weight” was used to compute the stan-
dard error and the weight of each effect. The aggregated effect
size consists of the sum of the weight and the effect size multi-
plication, divided by the sum of the weights. Finally, confidence
intervals were calculated by taking the effect size (Cohen’s d) and
the standard error into account.
RESULTS
We review below the findings of the studies that have investigated
the relationship between EI and ER. Each family is presented in
turn. Each section begins with results relative to trait EI which
form the majority of the studies analyzed. The sections then turn
to results regarding ability EI when these are available. The effect
sizes (with confidence interval) of EI in each study are reported in
Table 1. The aggregated effect size (with confidence interval) of EI
on each ER family is reported in Table 2 for trait EI and Table 3
for ability EI.
EI AND SITUATION SELECTION
As we previously mentioned, selecting situations depending on
the expected emotional impact requires being able to accurately
forecast how one is likely to feel in different situations, and then
use that information to confront situations that are likely to
bring long-term benefits, while avoiding the others. Accordingly,
we hypothesized that high EI people would make more accu-
rate affective forecasts comparing to their low EI peers. We also
hypothesized that high EI individuals would do their best to pre-
vent negative situations to occur (which should result in less daily
hassles) but that they not avoid negative/stressful situations if they
were to bring long-term benefits. In the latter case, high EI people
would on the contrary struggle to deal with the situation rather
than giving up their goal.
Empirical evidence suggests that trait EI increases affective
forecasting accuracy (Hoerger et al., 2012). It must nonetheless
be noted that Dunn et al. (2007) found only a non-significant
trend in a smaller sample. Schutte et al. (2009) have shown that
people with high trait EI use that knowledge to select situations
more effectively (i.e., spend time in situations that boost wanted
emotions or prevent unwanted emotions, seek out situations that
inspire positive emotions or avoid those that arouse negative
emotions). This may explain why two studies (Ciarrochi et al.,
2002; Day et al., 2005) found negative correlations between trait
EI and the self-reported frequency of various daily hassles such
as marital, professional, health, financial and relationship hassles.
It is also congruent with the findings that high trait EI people
take more time to relax and wind down (Tsaousis and Nikolaou,
2005).
It is noteworthy that high EI individuals do not simply avoid
all situations that could cause them negative emotions. As shown
in Table 2, they actually report using less avoidant coping strate-
gies than their peers (Gerits et al., 2004; Petrides et al., 2007a,b;
Mikolajczak et al., 2009a, Studies 1 and 2; Rogers et al., 2006;
Velasco et al., 2006; Shah and Thingujam, 2008; Kim and Agrusa,
2011; although see Monaci et al., 2013 for insignificant results).
This is probably becausemany situations that cause negative emo-
tions in the short-term have long-term benefits (academic exams
for instance). Experimental and field studies support the idea that
high trait EI individuals tend to struggle (confront) rather than
give up (escape/avoid) in the face of adversity if the confronta-
tion is likely to bring about more substantial long-term benefits.
For example, an experimental study by Schutte et al. (2001b)
showed that participants who scored higher in trait emotional
intelligence solved more problems after encountering a very dif-
ficult and frustrating set of problems. This held true even when
initial performance was held constant. In the same vein, a field
study by Petrides et al. (2006a) showed that trait EI was positively
related to the length of musical training among music school
students, suggesting that high trait EI individuals do not let them-
selves be discouraged by the obstacles that stand in their way.
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Table 1 | Linking emotional intelligence to the use of emotion regulation strategies.
Authors N ER Family Specific
variable
T/A Measure used Facet r CI r (lower
bound)
CI r (upper
bound)
d
Schutte et al., 2009 73 SS Situation
selection
T AES 0.30 0.08 0.49 0.63
Ciarrochi et al., 2002 302 SS Daily hassles T EIS −0.01 −0.12 0.10 −0.02
Day et al., 2005 133 SS Daily hassles T EQ-I AGS −0.43 −0.51 −0.27 −0.94
Kim and Agrusa, 2011 385 SS Avoidant coping T WLEIS 0.15 0.05 0.25 0.30
Shah and Thingujam, 2008 197 SS Avoidant coping T EIS AGS −0.08 −0.22 0.06 −0.16
Rogers et al., 2006 253 SS Avoidant coping T SREIT −0.04 −0.16 0.08 −0.08
Velasco et al., 2006 593 SS Avoidant coping T TMMS-alex F1 −0.16 −0.24 −0.08 −0.32
Petrides et al., 2007a (study 1) 166 SS Avoidant coping T modified EQ-i −0.34 −0.47 −0.20 −0.72
Petrides et al., 2007a (study2
sample1)
200 SS Avoidant coping T TEIQue-LF −0.39 −0.50 −0.27 −0.84
Petrides et al., 2007b 274 SS Avoidant coping T TEIQue-LF 0.01 −0.11 0.13 0.02
MacCann et al., 2011 159 SS Avoidant coping A MSCEIT AGS −0.21 −0.35 −0.06 −0.43
Gerits et al., 2004 380 SS Avoidant coping T EQ-i −0.23 −0.32 −0.13 −0.47
Monaci et al., 2013 198 SS Avoidant coping T SEIS 0.01 −0.13 0.15 0.02
Mikolajczak et al., 2009a 490 SS Avoidant coping T TEIQue-ASF −0.26 −0.34 −0.18 −0.54
Petrides et al., 2006a 37 SS Perseverance T TEIQue-LF 0.53 0.25 0.74 1.25
Dunn et al., 2007 84 SS Forecast
accuracy
A MSCEIT −0.19 0.06 0.62 −0.38
Dunn et al., 2007 84 SS Forecast
accuracy
T SREIS −0.09 −0.39 0.02 −0.18
Hoerger et al., 2012 (study 1) 81 SS Forecast
accuracy
T SEI/SREIS/TEIQue 0.22 −0.30 0.13 0.45
Hoerger et al., 2012 (study 1) 81 SS Forecast
accuracy
A JET+IJI 0.36 −0.01 0.41 0.77
Hoerger et al., 2012 (study 2) 81 SS Forecast
accuracy
T TEIQue-SF 0.27 0.16 0.54 0.56
Hoerger et al., 2012 (study 2) 81 SS Forecast
accuracy
A JET + IJI +
STEU
0.39 0.07 0.47 0.84
Schutte et al., 2001b 38 SS Persistence T SEIS 0.37 0.19 0.56 0.79
Bastian et al., 2005 246 SS Behavioral
disengagement
T TMMS + AES R+C −0.24 −0.35 −0.12 −0.49
Bastian et al., 2005 246 SS Behavioral
disengagement
A MSCEIT −0.16 −0.28 −0.04 −0.32
Tsaousis and Nikolaou, 2005 365 SS Time to relax T TEIQ 0.43 0.35 0.51 0.95
Schutte et al., 2009 73 SM Modifying
situations
T EIS 0.20 −0.03 0.42 0.41
Moradi et al., 2011 200 SM Problem-focused
coping
T TMMS R+C 0.27 0.14 0.40 0.56
Petrides et al., 2007a (study 1) 166 SM Problem-focused
coping
T modified EQ-i 0.57 0.46 0.67 1.38
Petrides et al., 2007a (study
2. sample 1)
200 SM Problem-focused
coping
T TEIQue-LF 0.67 0.59 0.75 1.80
Petrides et al., 2007b 274 SM Problem-focused
coping
T TEIQue-LF 0.64 0.57 0.71 1.66
MacCann et al., 2011 159 SM Problem-focused
coping
A MSCEIT AGS 0.14 −0.02 0.29 0.28
Shah and Thingujam, 2008 197 SM Problem-focused
coping
T EIS AGS 0.21 0.07 0.34 0.43
Goldenberg et al., 2006 223 SM Problem-focused
coping
T SREIS 0.55 0.46 0.64 1.31
Goldenberg et al., 2006 223 SM Problem-focused
coping
A MSCEIT 0.17 0.04 0.30 0.34
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Authors N ER Family Specific
variable
T/A Measure used Facet r CI r (lower
bound)
CI r (upper
bound)
d
Kluemper, 2008 180 SM Problem-focused
coping
T WLEIS 0.61 0.51 0.70 1.54
Rogers et al., 2006 253 SM Problem-focused
coping
T SREIT 0.30 0.19 0.41 0.63
Mikolajczak et al., 2008 203 SM Problem-focused
coping
T TEIQue-LF 0.40 0.29 0.51 0.87
Salovey et al., 2002 (study 3) 48 SM Problem-focused
coping
T TMMS R+C 0.34 0.06 0.57 0.71
Saklofske et al., 2007 362 SM Problem-focused
coping
T EIS 0.38 0.29 0.46 0.82
Almran and Punamaki, 2008 312 SM Problem-focused
coping
T EQ-I:YV-S 0.25 0.14 0.36 0.51
Velasco et al., 2006 593 SM Problem-focused
coping
T TMMS-alex F1 0.20 0.12 0.28 0.41
Rahim and Minors, 2003 222 SM Problem solving T EQ-Index AGS 0.44 0.33 0.54 0.98
Monaci et al., 2013 198 SM Direct
confrontation
T SEIS 0.43 0.31 0.54 0.95
Montes-Berges and Augusto,
2007
119 SM Active coping T TMMS-24 R+C 0.05 −0.13 0.23 0.11
Gerits et al., 2004 380 SM Active coping T EQ-I 0.38 0.29 0.46 0.82
Tsarenko and Strizhakova,
2013
252 SM Active coping T SREIS 0.45 0.34 0.54 1.01
Zomer, 2012 300 SM Active coping T TMMS-24 R+C 0.15 0.04 0.26 0.30
Bastian et al., 2005 246 SM Active coping +
planning
T TMMS + AES R+C 0.40 0.28 0.51 0.87
Bastian et al., 2005 246 SM Active coping +
planning
A MSCEIT 0.05 −0.08 0.18 0.10
Bastian et al., 2005 246 SM Problem Solving
Inventory
T TMMS + AES R+C −0.43 −0.53 −0.32 −0.94
Bastian et al., 2005 246 SM Problem Solving
Inventory
A MSCEIT −0.04 −0.17 0.09 −0.08
Austin et al., 2010 475 SM Task-oriented
coping
T EQ:i-S AGS 0.38 0.30 0.45 0.82
Saklofske et al., 2012 238 SM Task-oriented
coping
T EQ:i S AGS 0.48 0.38 0.57 1.09
Kim and Agrusa, 2011 385 SM Task coping T WLEIS 0.54 0.46 0.61 1.28
Mikolajczak et al., 2009a 490 SM Rational coping T TEIQue-ASF 0.46 0.39 0.53 1.03
Monaci et al., 2013 198 SM Social support T SEIS 0.36 0.24 0.48 0.77
Bastian et al., 2005 246 SM Instrumental
social support
T TMMS+AES R+C 0.24 0.11 0.35 0.49
Bastian et al., 2005 246 SM Instrumental
social support
A MSCEIT 0.06 −0.07 0.19 0.12
Zomer, 2012 300 SM Support from
others
T TMMS-24 R+C 0.11 0.00 0.22 0.21
Gerits et al., 2004 380 SM Social support
seeking
T EQ-i 0.21 0.11 0.31 0.43
Shah and Thingujam, 2008 197 SM Social support
seeking
T EIS AGS 0.07 −0.08 0.21 0.13
Ciarrochi and Deane, 2001 300 SM Social support
seeking
T EIS AGS 0.15 0.05 0.25 0.26
Velasco et al., 2006 593 SM Social support
seeking
T TMMS-alex F1 0.13 0.05 0.21 0.26
Goldenberg et al., 2006 223 SM Social support
seeking
T SREIS 0.32 0.20 0.43 0.67
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Authors N ER Family Specific
variable
T/A Measure used Facet r CI r (lower
bound)
CI r (upper
bound)
d
Goldenberg et al., 2006 223 SM Social support
seeking
A MSCEIT 0.42 0.31 0.52 0.92
Zeidner and Kloda, 2013 200 SM Conflict
res.(constructive)
A MSCEIT 0.24 0.11 0.37 0.49
Zeidner and Kloda, 2013 200 SM Conflict
res.(avoidance)
A MSCEIT −0.39 −0.50 −0.26 −0.84
Jordan and Troth, 2004 350 SM Conflict res.
(integrate)
T WEIP6 0.35 0.25 0.44 0.74
Jordan and Troth, 2004 350 SM Conflict res.
(avoid)
T WEIP6 −0.12 −0.23 −0.01 −0.24
Jordan and Troth, 2004 350 SM Conflict res.
(dominate)
T WEIP6 0.19 0.09 0.29 0.38
Jordan and Troth, 2002 139 SM Conflict res.
(collaborate)
T WEIP6 0.53 0.40 0.64 1.25
Jordan and Troth, 2002 139 SM Conflict res.
(avoidance)
T WEIP6 −0.12 −0.28 0.04 −0.24
Jordan and Troth, 2002 139 SM Conflict
resolution (force)
T WEIP6 0.02 −0.15 0.19 0.04
Jordan and Troth, 2002 139 SM Conflict res.
(accommodate)
T WEIP6 −0.08 −0.24 0.08 −0.01
Jordan and Troth, 2002 139 SM Conflict res.
(compromise)
T WEIP6 0.09 −0.08 0.25 0.02
Salami, 2010b 320 SM Conflict res.
(confronting)
T WLEIS 0.20 0.10 0.30 0.41
Salami, 2010b 320 SM Conflict res.
(withdrawal)
T WLEIS 0.12 0.01 0.23 0.24
Salami, 2010b 320 SM Conflict
resolution
(forcing)
T WLEIS 0.12 0.01 0.23 0.24
Salami, 2010b 320 SM Conflict res.
(smoothe)
T WLEIS 0.19 0.08 0.29 0.38
Salami, 2010b 320 SM Conflict res.
(compromise)
T WLEIS 0.21 0.10 0.31 0.43
Bastian et al., 2005 246 SM Restraint T TMMS+AES 0.08 −0.05 0.21 0.16
Bastian et al., 2005 246 SM Restraint A MSCEIT −0.04 −0.17 0.09 −0.08
Schutte et al., 2009 73 AD Attention
deployment
T EIS 0.38 0.17 0.56 0.82
Bastian et al., 2005 246 AD Mental
disengagement
T TMMS+AES −0.05 −0.18 0.08 −0.10
Bastian et al., 2005 246 AD Mental
disengagement
A MSCEIT −0.05 −0.18 0.08 −0.10
Mikolajczak et al., 2008 203 AD Trait distraction T TEIQue-LF 0.41 0.29 0.52 0.89
Salovey et al., 2002 (study 3) 48 AD State distraction T TMMS R+C 0.36 0.08 0.59 0.77
Saklofske et al., 2012 238 AD Distraction T EQ-i: S −0.11 −0.23 0.02 −0.21
Austin et al., 2010 475 AD Distraction T EQ-i: S 0.18 0.09 0.27 0.37
Lanciano et al., 2012 157 AD Dysfunctional
rumination
A MSCEIT AGS −0.44 −0.56 −0.30 −0.98
Petrides et al., 2007b 274 AD Trait rumination T TEIQue-LF −0.47 −0.56 −0.38 −1.06
Petrides et al., 2007a (study 1) 166 AD Trait rumination T modified EQ-i −0.53 −0.64 −0.42 −1.25
Mikolajczak et al., 2008 203 AD Trait Rumination T TEIQue-LF −0.10 −0.24 0.04 −0.20
Ramos et al., 2007 144 AD State rumination T TMMS R+C −0.11 −0.27 0.05 −0.21
Salovey et al., 2002 (study 3) 48 AD State rumination T TMMS R+C −0.27 −0.51 0.02 −0.55
Salguero et al., 2013 1154 AD Rumination T TMMS-24 R+C −0.11 −0.17 −0.05 −0.22
Brown and Ryan, 2003 645 AD Mindful attention T TMMS-24 R+C 0.40 0.33 0.46 0.87
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Authors N ER Family Specific
variable
T/A Measure used Facet r CI r (lower
bound)
CI r (upper
bound)
d
Wang and Kong, 2014 321 AD Mindful attention T WLEIS 0.33 0.23 0.42 0.70
Schutte and Malouff, 2011 125 AD Mindful attention T AES 0.65 0.53 0.74 1.71
Kokinda, 2010 108 AD Mindful attention T AES 0.47 0.31 0.63 1.06
Charoensukmongkol, 2014 317 AD Mindful attention T WLEIS 0.32 0.22 0.42 0.68
Baer et al., 2004 (study 4) 130 AD Mindful attention T TMMS-24 R+C 0.24 0.07 0.40 0.49
Totterdell and Holman, 2003 18 AD Focus on
positive
T EIS 0.46 −0.01 0.79 1.03
Schutte et al., 2009 73 CC Cognitive
change
T AES 0.26 0.03 0.46 0.54
Charoensukmongkol, 2014 317 CC Self-efficacy T WLEIS 0.68 0.61 0.74 1.86
Brown et al., 2003 288 CC Self-efficacy T EII-R 0.25 0.14 0.36 0.50
Chan, 2004 158 CC Self-efficacy T EIS 0.32 0.17 0.45 0.66
Martin et al., 2004 140 CC Self-efficacy T EJI 0.54 0.41 0.65 1.27
Durán et al., 2006 373 CC Self-efficacy T TMMS R+C 0.34 0.24 0.42 0.72
Kaur et al., 2006 117 CC Self-efficacy T EIS 0.42 0.26 0.56 0.92
Villanueva and Sanchez, 2007 70 CC Self-efficacy T SSRI 0.36 0.13 0.54 0.77
Di Fabio and Palazzeschi,
2008
169 CC Self-efficacy T EQ-i 0.34 0.20 0.47 0.72
Adeyemo, 2007 300 CC Self-efficacy T EQ-i 0.17 0.06 0.28 0.34
Mikolajczak et al., 2006 95 CC Self-efficacy T TEIQue-LF 0.66 0.53 0.76 1.75
Mikolajczak and Luminet,
2008 (study1)
27 CC Self-efficacy T TEIQue-LF 0.50 0.15 0.75 1.15
Mikolajczak and Luminet,
2008 (study2)
15 CC Self-efficacy T TEIQue-SF 0.29 −0.27 0.70 0.60
Kirk et al., 2008 207 CC Self-efficaccy T AES 0.73 0.66 0.79 2.13
Kirk et al., 2008 207 CC Self-efficaccy A MSCEIT 0.34 0.22 0.46 0.72
Animasahun, 2008 300 CC Self-efficacy T EIS 0.43 0.33 0.52 0.95
Salami, 2010a 242 CC Self-efficacy T WLEIS 0.08 −0.05 0.21 0.16
Tsarenko and Strizhakova,
2013
252 CC Self-efficacy T SREIS 0.57 0.48 0.65 1.38
Mouton et al., 2013 119 CC Self-efficacy T TEIQue 0.28 0.11 0.44 0.58
Di Fabio and Saklofske, 2014b 164 CC Core
self-evaluationa
T TEIQue/EQ-i 0.56 0.45 0.65 1.35
Di Fabio and Saklofske, 2014b 164 CC Core
self-evaluation
A MSCEIT 0.02 −0.13 0.17 0.04
Kluemper, 2008 180 CC Core
self-evaluation
T WLEIS 0.73 0.65 0.79 2.14
Di Fabio and Saklofske, 2014a 194 CC Self-Efficacy A MSCEIT 0.23 0.09 0.35 0.47
Di Fabio and Saklofske, 2014a 194 CC Self-Efficacy T EQ-i 0.67 0.58 0.74 1.80
Mikolajczak and Luminet,
2008 (study2)
15 CC Ratio
challenge/threat
T TEIQue-SF 0.72 0.33 0.9 2.07
Mikolajczak et al., 2006 70 CC Challenge
appraisal
T TEIQue-LF 0.02 −0.22 0.26 0.04
Mikolajczak et al., 2006 70 CC Threat appraisal T TEIQue-LF −0.41 −0.60 −0.20 −0.89
Schutte et al., 2009 73 CC Reappraisal T AES 0.46 0.26 0.62 1.03
Shah and Thingujam, 2008 197 CC Positive
reappraisal
T EIS AGS 0.21 0.07 0.34 0.43
Mikolajczak et al., 2008 203 CC Reappraisal T TEIQue-LF 0.46 0.34 0.56 1.03
Velasco et al., 2006 593 CC Positive
reappraisal
T TMMS-alex F1 0.23 0.15 0.31 0.47
Kafetsios and Loumakou,
2007
475 CC Reappraisal T EQ-I 0.04 −0.08 0.16 0.08
Cabello et al., 2013 866 CC Reappraisal T TMMS-24 R+C 0.34 0.28 0.40 0.72
Coumans, 2005 31 CC Reappraisal T TEIQue-LF 0.02 −0.34 0.38 0.04
(Continued)
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Authors N ER Family Specific
variable
T/A Measure used Facet r CI r (lower
bound)
CI r (upper
bound)
d
Totterdell and Holman, 2003 18 CC Perspective
taking
T EIS 0.21 −0.29 0.62 0.43
Moradi et al., 2011 200 CC Reappraisal T TMMS R+C 0.45 0.34 0.56 1.01
Bastian et al., 2005 246 CC Positive
interpretation
T TMMS+AES R+C 0.50 0.40 0.59 1.15
Bastian et al., 2005 246 CC Positive
interpretation
A MSCEIT 0.11 −0.02 0.24 0.21
Bastian et al., 2005 246 CC Adaptive
Humour
T TMMS+AES R+C 0.14 0.01 0.26 0.28
Bastian et al., 2005 246 CC Adaptive
Humour
A MSCEIT 0.04 −0.09 0.17 0.08
Zomer, 2012 300 CC Adaptive
Humour
T TMMS-24 R+C 0.01 −0.10 0.12 0.02
Greven et al., 2008 1038 CC Adaptive
Humour
T TEIQue-LF 0.45 0.40 0.50 0.99
Greven et al., 2008 1038 CC Maladaptive
Humour
T TEIQue-LF −0.27 −0.33 −0.21 −0.55
Tsarenko and Strizhakova,
2013
252 CC Denial T SREIS −0.09 −0.21 0.03 −0.18
Zomer, 2012 300 CC Denial T TMMS-24 R+C −0.16 −0.27 −0.05 −0.32
Bastian et al., 2005 246 CC Denial T TMMS+AES −0.15 −0.27 −0.02 −0.30
Bastian et al., 2005 246 CC Denial A MSCEIT −0.20 −0.32 −0.08 −0.41
Zomer, 2012 300 CC Acceptance T TMMS-24 R+C 0.09 −0.02 0.20 0.17
Bastian et al., 2005 246 CC Acceptance T TMMS+ AES 0.38 0.26 0.48 0.82
Bastian et al., 2005 246 CC Acceptance A MSCEIT 0.10 −0.03 0.23 0.21
Mikolajczak et al., 2008 203 CC Acceptance T TEIQue-LF −0.06 −0.20 0.08 −0.12
Bastian et al., 2005 246 RM Venting T TMMS+AES 0.05 −0.08 0.18 0.10
Bastian et al., 2005 246 RM Venting A MSCEIT 0.02 −0.11 0.15 0.03
Zomer, 2012 300 RM Venting T TMMS-24 R+C −0.27 −0.37 −0.16 −0.56
Schutte et al., 2009 73 RM suppression
(ERQ)
T EIS −0.50 −0.66 −0.31 −1.15
Johnson and Spector, 2007 176 RM Suppression T WLEIS −0.08 −0.23 0.07 −0.16
Austin et al., 2008 247 RM Suppression T TEIQue-SF −0.45 −0.55 −0.35 −1.01
Mikolajczak et al., 2007b 124 RM Suppression T TEIQue-SF −0.31 −0.46 −0.14 −0.65
Totterdell and Holman, 2003 18 RM Suppression T EIS −0.18 −0.60 0.31 −0.36
Velasco et al., 2006 593 RM Suppression T TMMS-alex F1 −0.28 −0.35 −0.21 −0.58
Kafetsios and Loumakou,
2007
475 RM Suppression
(ERQ)
T EQ-I −0.08 −0.20 0.04 −0.16
Cabello et al., 2013 866 RM Suppression T TMMS-24 R+C −0.13 −0.20 −0.06 −0.26
Lee and Ok, 2012 309 RM Emotional
dissonance
T WLEIS −0.22 −0.33 −0.11 −0.45
Rivers et al., 2013 243 RM Aggressive
behavior
A MSCEIT −0.25 −0.36 −0.13 −0.51
Brackett et al., 2004 330 RM Deviant behavior A MSCEIT −0.27 −0.37 −0.17 −0.56
Brackett and Mayer, 2003 207 RM Social deviance T EQ-i/SREIT −0.14 −0.27 0.00 −0.28
Shahzad et al., 2013 140 RM Aggression T TEIQue-ASF −0.31 −0.45 −0.15 −0.64
Mikolajczak et al., 2009a 490 RM Self-harm T TEIQue-ASF −0.31 −0.39 −0.23 −0.65
Karim and Shah, 2014 192 RM Suicidal ideation A MSCEIT AGS −0.30 −0.42 −0.16 −0.63
Aradilla-Herrero et al., 2014 93 RM Suicide risk T TMMS-24 R+C −0.21 −0.40 −0.01 −0.43
Gardner et al., 2014 235 RM Bulimic
symptoms
T MEIA −0.22 −0.34 −0.10 −0.45
Gardner et al., 2014 235 RM Bulimic
symptoms
A MSCEIT −0.07 −0.20 0.06 −0.14
Gardner et al., 2014 235 RM Binge eating T MEIA −0.21 −0.33 −0.08 −0.43
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Authors N ER Family Specific
variable
T/A Measure used Facet r CI r (lower
bound)
CI r (upper
bound)
d
Gardner et al., 2014 235 RM Binge eating A MSCEIT −0.03 −0.16 0.10 −0.06
Pettit et al., 2010 402 RM Bulimia/Food
preocupation
T TMMS-24 R+C −0.13 −0.23 −0.03 −0.26
Markey and Vander Wal, 2007 154 RM Bulimic
symptoms
T EQ- i:S −0.31 −0.45 −0.16 −0.65
Brackett et al., 2004 330 RM Illegal drug use A MSCEIT −0.11 −0.22 0.00 −0.22
Brackett et al., 2004 330 RM Alcohol use A MSCEIT −0.13 −0.24 −0.02 −0.26
Rossen and Kranzler, 2009 150 RM Alcohol use A MSCEIT −0.21 −0.35 −0.07 −0.43
Tsaousis and Nikolaou, 2005 365 RM Alcohol units T TEIQ −0.07 −0.17 0.03 −0.14
Austin et al., 2005 115 RM Acohol
consumption
T REIS −0.19 −0.37 −0.01 −0.38
Ghee and Johnson, 2008 214 RM Alcohol
consumption
T EIS −0.02 −0.15 0.11 −0.04
Riley and Schutte, 2003 141 RM Acohol
consumption
T EIS −0.34 −0.48 −0.2 −0.72
Brackett and Mayer, 2003 207 RM Alcohol
consumption
T EQ-i/SREIT −0.13 −0.26 0.01 −0.26
Trinidad and Johnson, 2002 205 RM Alcohol
consumption
A MEIS −0.12 −0.26 0.01 −0.25
Saklofske et al., 2007 362 RM Alcohol
consumption
T EIS −0.05 −0.15 0.05 −0.10
Brackett and Mayer, 2003 207 RM Illegal drug user
scale
T EQ-i/SREIT −0.14 −0.27 −0.003 −0.28
Riley and Schutte, 2003 141 RM Drug abuse T EIS −0.42 −0.55 −0.29 −0.92
Limonero et al., 2006 133 RM Canabis smoking T TMMS R+C −0.01 −0.19 0.16 −0.02
Bastian et al., 2005 246 RM Substance use T TMMS+AES −0.05 −0.18 0.08 −0.10
Bastian et al., 2005 246 RM Substance use A MSCEIT −0.02 −0.14 0.11 −0.03
Rivers et al., 2013 243 RM Substance
abuse
A MSCEIT −0.18 −0.31 −0.06 −0.36
Schutte et al., 2011 100 RM Alcohol
problems
A MSCEIT −0.30 −0.46 −0.11 −0.63
Schutte et al., 2011 100 RM Alcohol
problems
T AES −0.27 −0.45 −0.08 −0.56
Zomer, 2012 300 RM Drugs T TMMS-24 R+C −0.11 −0.22 0.00 0.21
Monaci et al., 2013 198 RM Alcohol use T SEIS −0.05 −0.19 0.09 −0.10
Solanki and Lane, 2010 315 RM Exercise mood
regulating
T EIS 0.45 0.35 0.53 1.01
SS, Situation Selection; SM, Situation Modification; AD, Attentional Deployment; CC, Cognitive Change; RM, Response Modulation; T/A, Trait or Ability EI measure:
T, trait EI measure, A, ability EI measure; AGS, Aggregated Global Score; R + C, Repair + Clarity; AES, Assessing Emotions Scale; EIS, Emotional Intelligence Scale;
EQ-i/YV/S, Emotional Quotient Inventory/Young Version/Short; WLEIS, The Wong and Law Emotional Intelligence Scale; SREIT, Self Report Emotional Intelligence
Test; TMMS-24, Trait Meta Mood Scale; TEIQ, The Traits Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire; TEIQue/SF/LF/ASF, Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire/Short-
Form/Long-Form/Adolescent Short-Form; MSCEIT, The Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test; SEIS, Schutte Emotional Intelligence Scale; SREIS,
Self-Reported Emotional Intelligence Scale; EQ-Index, Emotional Quotient Index; WEIP6, Workgroup Emotional Intelligence Profile-Version 6; EII-R, Emotional
Intelligence Inventory Revised; MEIS, Multifactoral Emotional Intelligence Scale; EJI, Emotional Judgment Inventory; SSRI, Schutte Self-Report Inventory; MEIA,
Multidimensional Emotional Intelligence Assessment; REIS, Revised Emotional Intelligence Scale; SEI, Survey of Emotional Intelligence. JET, Judgment of Emotions
Test; IJI, Interpersonal Judgment Inventory; STEU, Situational Test of Emotional Understanding.
*The forecast accuracy indices were calculated such that higher numbers indicate poorer accuracy.
aThe core self-evaluation construct is a fundamental part of self-evaluated values, efficacy and abilities. It includes self-esteem, self-efficacy, internal locus of control,
and absence of pessimism.
Consistent with these results, Bastian et al. (2005)7 found that EI
was associated to “behavioral disengagement” as people with high
7The authors provided us with subcorrelations between Trait EI and the
“Behavioral Disengagement” subscale of the COPE.
EI made an effort to deal with the stressor, and did not give up the
attempt to attain goals with which the stressor was interfering.
The studies that investigated ability EI in relation to situation
selection strategies show that people with high ability EI make
more accurate affective forecasts (Dunn et al., 2007; Hoerger et al.,
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Table 2 | Linking emotional intelligence (trait) to the use of emotion regulation strategies.
ER family ER strategy Number of Total N Dir. of effect Effect-size (d) 95% Confidence Interval
studies Interval around d
Situation selection Forecast accuracy* 1 84 − −0.18 [−0.40; 0.04]
Forecast accuracy 2 162 + 0.51 [0.35; 0.66]
Situation selection 1 73 + 0.63 [0.39; 0.86]
Daily hassles 2 435 − −0.30 [−0.39; −0.20]
Time to relax 1 365 + 0.95 [0.85; 1.06]
Avoidant-coping 10 3136 − −0.27 [ −0.31; −0.24]
Perseverance 2 75 + 1.02 [0.78; 1.25]
Behavioral disengagement 1 246 − −0.49 [−0.58; −0.40]
Situation modification Situation modification 1 73 + 0.41 [0.17; 0.64]
Problem solving 24 6516 + 0.92 [0.90; 0.94]
Problem solving (negative) 1 492 − −1.06 [−1.19; −0.93]
Social support search 8 2437 + 0.38 [0.34; 0.40]
Constructive conflict resolution 5 1268 + 0.56 [0.50; 0.61]
Conflict resolution (avoid) 4 948 − −0.04 [−0.11; 0.02]
Conflict resolution (dominate) 3 809 + 0.27 [0.20; 0.34]
Restraint 1 246 + 0.16 [0.03; 0.29]
Attentional deployment Attention deployment 1 73 + 0.82 [0.59; 1.06]
Focus on positive 1 18 + 1.04 [0.53; 1.54]
Rumination 6 1989 − −0.43 [−0.47; −0.38]
Distraction 5 1210 + 0.26 [0.21; 0.32]
Mindfulness 6 1646 + 0.85 [0.80; 0.90]
Cognitive Change Challenge appraisal 2 85 + 0.35 [0.13; 0.57]
Threat appraisal 1 70 − −0.90 [−1.14; −0.66]
Self-efficacy 20 3727 + 1.08 [1.05; 1.11]
Reappraisal 10 2902 + 0.61 [0.58; 0.65]
Adaptive humour 3 1584 + 0.72 [0.67; 0.76]
Maladaptive humour 1 1038 − −0.55 [−0.61; −0.49]
Denial 3 798 − −0.27 [−0.34; −0.20]
Acceptance 3 749 + 0.31 [0.23; 0.38]
Cognitive change 1 73 + 0.54 [0.30; 0.77]
Response modulation Exercise as a mood regulating strategy 1 315 + 1.01 [0.90; 1.12]
Venting 2 546 − −0.26 [−0.35; −0.18]
Suppression 9 2881 − −0.43 [−0.47; −0.39]
Aggressivity 2 347 − −0.43 [−0.53; −0.33]
Self−harm 2 583 − −0.62 [−0.70; −0.53]
Substance use 13 2729 − −0.25 [−0.29; −0.21]
Bullimia/Food preocupation 4 1026 − −0.40 [−0.46; −0.34]
*The forecast accuracy indices were calculated such that higher numbers indicate poorer accuracy.
2012), use less avoidant coping strategies (MacCann et al., 2011)
and strive more to attain their goals (Bastian et al., 2005)8.
EI AND SITUATION MODIFICATION
We hypothesized that high EI individuals would take steps
to modify a disadvantageous situation. We also expect them
to make use of both their social skills and their aptitude
to express emotions to prompt situation modification when
8See footnote 7.
this requires the intervention of a third party. Therefore, we
predicted that high EI individuals would use constructive con-
flict resolutions rather than avoidant ones. Finally, we hypoth-
esized a positive relationship between EI and restraint (i.e.,
waiting for the appropriate moment to act, avoiding to act
prematurely).
Empirical evidence indicates that when confronted with a
negative situation, high trait EI individuals are more likely to
modify the situation (Schutte et al., 2009) and take action to
change things than their low trait EI counterparts (Salovey et al.,
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Table 3 | Linking emotional intelligence (ability) to the use of emotion regulation strategies.
ER family ER strategy Number of Total N Dir. of effect Effect-size (d) 95% Confidence Interval
studies around d
Situation selection Forecast accuracy* 1 84 − −0.45 [−0.67; −0.23]
Forecast accuracy 2 162 + 0.81 [0.65; 0.97]
Avoidant coping 1 159 − −0.43 [−0.59; −0.27]
Behavioral disengagement 1 246 − −0.32 [−0.44; −0.19]
Situation modification Problem solving 3 628 + 0.23 [0.15; 0.31]
Problem solving (negative) 1 246 − −0.08 [−0.21; 0.05]
Social support seeking 2 469 + 0.50 [0.41; 0.59]
Conflict resolution 1 200 + 0.49 [0.35; 0.63]
Conflict resolution (avoid) 1 200 − −0.85 [−0.99; −0.71]
Restraint 1 246 + 0.15 [0.02; 0.28]
Attentional deployment Rumination 1 157 − −0.98 [−1.14; −0.82]
Mental disengagement 1 246 − −0.10 [−0.23; 0.03]
Cognitive change Self-efficacy 3 564 + 0.47 [0.33; 0.61]
Positive interpretation 1 246 + 0.21 [0.08; 0.34]
Humour 1 246 + 0.08 [−0.05; 0.21]
Denial 1 246 − −0.41 [−0.54; −0.28]
Acceptance 1 246 + 0.21 [0.08; 0.34]
Response modulation Venting 1 246 + 0.27 [0.14; 0.40]
Aggressive behavior 2 573 − −0.54 [−0.62; −0.46]
Self-harm 1 192 − −0.63 [−0.77; −0.49]
Substance use 7 1604 − −0.27 [−0.32; −0.22]
Bulimia/Food preocupation 2 470 − −0.10 [−0.19; −0.01]
*The forecast accuracy indices were calculated such that higher numbers indicate poorer accuracy.
2002 (Study 3); Rahim and Minors, 2003; Gerits et al., 2004;
Bastian et al., 20059; Goldenberg et al., 2006; Rogers et al., 2006;
Velasco et al., 2006; Petrides et al., 2007a,b; Saklofske et al., 2007,
2012; Almran and Punamaki, 2008; Kluemper, 2008; Mikolajczak
et al., 2008, 2009a; Shah and Thingujam, 2008; Austin et al.,
2010; Noorbakhsh et al., 2010; Kim and Agrusa, 2011; Moradi
et al., 2011; Zomer, 2012; Monaci et al., 2013; Tsarenko and
Strizhakova, 2013; although see Montes-Berges and Augusto,
2007 for null results). The relationship between trait EI and
the restraint coping strategy does not reach significance though.
Namely, people with high trait EI are not significantly more able
than people with low trait EI to await the appropriate opportunity
before taking action (that is, holding one-self back and not acting
prematurely) (Bastian et al., 2005)10.
Direct problem solving is not the only strategy used by high
trait EI individuals when it comes to modifying a situation. As
expected, these individuals also make use of indirect modifica-
tion strategies. First, high trait EI individuals report being more
willing to seek help from friends, family, and health profession-
als in case of problems (Ciarrochi and Deane, 2001; Gerits et al.,
9The authors provided us with subcorrelations between Trait EI and the
“Active Coping” and “Planning Coping” subscales of the COPE.
10The authors provided us with subcorrelations between Trait EI and the
“Restraint Coping” subscale of the COPE.
2004; Bastian et al., 200511; Goldenberg et al., 2006; Velasco et al.,
2006; Zomer, 2012; Monaci et al., 2013; although see Shah and
Thingujam, 2008, for insignificant results). Note that obtaining
adequate support may also be easier for them because EI has been
associated with increased perceived quantity and quality of social
support (e.g., Austin et al., 2005; Mikolajczak et al., 2007a).
Second, high EI people are, by definition, more able and
inclined to freely express both positive and negative emotions
which, according to Petrides and Furnham’s model (2003), trans-
lates into higher assertiveness. Thus, instead of fuming at the
cigarette smoke of their neighbor at table, high EI individuals
would typically ask to have the cigarette put out. However, studies
are needed to further test this claim. Third, EI seems to be related
to more constructive conflict resolution strategies, although the
pattern of results is not entirely clear (Jordan and Troth, 2002,
2004; Salami, 2010b).
Regarding ability EI, the results obtained are consistent with
those that use trait measures. Higher ability EI is associated
with greater use of problem-focused coping (Goldenberg et al.,
2006; MacCann et al., 2011; but see Bastian et al., 200512 for
11The authors provided us with subcorrelations between Trait EI and the
“Instrumental Social Support” subscale of the COPE.
12The authors provided us with subcorrelations between Trait EI and the
“Active Coping” and “Planning Coping” subscales of the COPE.
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non-significant results), although there is no significant relation-
ship between an individual’s ability to restrain him or herself
(wait for the appropriate moment to act and avoid acting pre-
maturely) and EI (Bastian et al., 2005)13. Ability EI also relates to
more social support seeking (Goldenberg et al., 2006; although
see Bastian et al., 200514 for non-significant results) and individ-
uals with high ability EI also use more constructive than avoidant
conflict resolution strategies (Zeidner and Kloda, 2013).
EI AND ATTENTIONAL DEPLOYMENT
Given that high EI people are characterized by greater positive
trait affectivity, we hypothesized that they would pay greater
attention to positive stimuli/events and ruminate less about neg-
ative events. It has indeed been shown that rumination on sad
or angry events increases the duration and intensity of nega-
tive emotions (Morrow and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Bushman,
2002). Unlike rumination, it is not clear how EI should be related
to distraction.
Empirical evidence indicates that high trait EI people rely
heavily on attentional deployment techniques to regulate their
emotions. First, people with higher trait EI report more mindful
attention awareness and pay greater, non-judgmental attention
to the present moment (Brown and Ryan, 2003; Baer et al.,
2004 (Study 4); Kokinda, 2010; Schutte and Malouff, 2011;
Charoensukmongkol, 2014; Wang and Kong, 2014). Consistent
with this finding, they report ruminating less about nega-
tive/stressful events than their lower EI counterparts (Salovey
et al., 2002 (Study 3); Petrides et al., 2007a,b; Ramos et al., 2007;
Salguero et al., 2013, although see Mikolajczak et al., 2008 for
non-significant results). Schutte et al. (2009) show that higher
trait EI people report paying greater attention to things that either
help arouse the emotions they desire or prevent them from expe-
riencing emotions they seek to avoid. Similarly, Totterdell and
Holman (2003) have shown that high trait EI individuals focus
more on positive things than people with low trait EI. These
individuals also report that they make more use of distraction
to regulate their emotions than their peers (Salovey et al., 2002
(Study 3); Bastian et al., 200515; Mikolajczak et al., 2008; Saklofske
et al., 2012; although see Austin et al., 2010 for non-significant
results).
Results concerning ability EI seem to be less consistent. While
Lanciano et al. (2012) found that high ability EI individuals rumi-
nate less than their equivalents, Bastian et al. (2005)16 showed
no significant relationship between ability EI and mental disen-
gagement. Future studies need to examine further the relationship
between ability EI and attentional deployment strategies.
EI AND COGNITIVE CHANGE
We predicted a positive relationship with challenge appraisal
because high EI individuals’ positive dispositions should lead
13The authors provided us with subcorrelations between Trait EI and the
“Restraint Coping” subscale of the COPE.
14The authors provided us with subcorrelations between Trait EI and the
“Instrumental Social Support” subscale of the COPE.
15The authors provided us with subcorrelations between Trait EI and the
“Mental Disengagement” subscale of the COPE.
16See footnote 15.
them to consider not only the potential losses but also potential
gains inherent to a situation. Likewise, we predicted a positive
link between EI and self-efficacy because high EI individuals’
previous successful attempts to regulate their emotions should
enhance their confidence to deal with negative events. We also
predicted a positive relationship with strategies such as reap-
praisal and adaptive humor which are useful when the situation
cannot be prevented, directly modified, or cognitively avoided
(e.g., an academic exam). Finally, we predicted a positive relation-
ship between trait EI and acceptance, but only for problems that
could not be modified or reappraised (e.g., being diagnosed with
terminal cancer).
Empirical studies show that trait EI is related to how
one views a given situation. When asked in January (exam
period) how threatening/challenging they appraised the exam
session, high EI freshmen judged it as much less threat-
ening than their low EI peers (Mikolajczak et al., 2006).
These findings were replicated twice in a laboratory setting.
Mikolajczak and Luminet (2008) found that high EI individu-
als tended to appraise an upcoming arithmetic task as a chal-
lenge whereas low trait EI individuals tended to appraise it as a
threat.
In addition to influencing how people perceive a given sit-
uation, EI also affects how one views one’s ability to manage
the demands the situation poses (naturally, the two are related).
In the above-mentioned study (Mikolajczak et al., 2006), when
asked at the beginning of the academic year about their self-
efficacy to manage the January exam session, high EI freshmen
reported higher self-efficacy than low EI individuals. This was all
the more interesting as there was no correlation between trait EI
and general cognitive ability (IQ; e.g., Mikolajczak et al., 2007a).
In order to rule out potentially confounding variables such as
prior knowledge of the subjects or social support, the study was
replicated within a laboratory setting (two studies). High trait EI
people reported greater self-efficacy to deal with the tasks (anal-
ysis of the psychological profile of a movie character in Study
1; an arithmetic task in Study 2) than their low trait EI peers
(Mikolajczak and Luminet, 2008). These results are consistent
with many others that reveal a relationship between trait EI and
self-efficacy (see Adeyemo, 2007 for self-efficacy to pass univer-
sity exams; Brown et al., 2003 for career decision-making self-
efficacy; Animasahun, 2008 for generalized self-efficacy; Chan,
2004 for general self-efficacy; Charoensukmongkol, 2014 for gen-
eral self-efficacy; Di Fabio and Palazzeschi, 2008 for self-efficacy
of teachers to deal with their classroom; Di Fabio and Saklofske,
2014a,b for core self-evaluation and career decision self-efficacy;
Durán et al. (2006) for general self-efficacy and self-efficacy to
succeed at university; Kaur et al., 2006 for self-efficacy to restrain
from gambling; Kirk et al., 2008 for emotional self-efficacy;
Kluemper, 2008 for core self-evaluation; Martin et al., 2004 for
self-efficacy in counseling; Mouton et al., 2013 for self-efficacy
among physical education teachers; Tsarenko and Strizhakova,
2013 for consumer self-efficacy; and Villanueva and Sanchez,
2007 for self-efficacy to perform a laboratory task and to coach
and lead followers to perform a laboratory task; although see
Salami, 2010a for a non-significant effect of trait EI on general
self-efficacy).
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When the initial17 appraisal of a situation and of one’s abil-
ity to manage it is not sufficient to achieve the desired emotional
state, individuals with higher trait EI report being more prone
to change the way they think in order to feel or prevent partic-
ular emotions (Schutte et al., 2009). In line with this, high trait
EI people report greater use of reappraisal strategies than low
EI people (Totterdell and Holman, 2003; Bastian et al., 200518;
Velasco et al., 2006;Mikolajczak et al., 2008; Shah and Thingujam,
2008; Schutte et al., 2009; Moradi et al., 2011; Cabello et al.,
2013 although see Kafetsios and Loumakou, 2007, for unsignif-
icant correlations). It must be noted that these results were not
replicated by Coumans (2005) who asked participants about the
utilization of several coping strategies after a forced failure in a
cognitive task. She found that high EI individuals were not more
likely than their low EI peers to report using positive reappraisal
strategies such as self-esteem rebuilding, putting things into per-
spective, trying to accept the situation as a part of life, or looking
for the silver lining. Future studies are clearly needed to delin-
eate the moderators and boundary conditions of this effect. It
is worth noting that the tendency of high EI people to change
the way they think in order to modify their feelings does not go
as far as denying the problem. Indeed, people with high trait EI
report using less denial strategies (Bastian et al., 200519; Zomer,
2012; Tsarenko and Strizhakova, 2013). Besides positive reap-
praisal, it seems that higher trait EI is associated with greater use
of humor (Bastian et al., 200520; Greven et al., 2008; although
see Zomer, 2012 for non-significant results) and less maladap-
tive humor (Greven et al., 2008). Finally, it must be noted that to
date, how trait EI relates to acceptance remains unclear. Although
Bastian et al. (2005)21 found that high EI individuals reported
accepting life events more easily, two other studies found no sig-
nificant correlation between high EI and acceptance (Mikolajczak
et al., 2008; Zomer, 2012).
As regards ability EI, these studies are consistent with the
results obtained using trait measures in various ways. First, there
is a positive relationship between high ability EI and self-efficacy
(Kirk et al., 2008; Di Fabio and Saklofske, 2014a,b). Second, peo-
ple with a high ability EI score report using less denial compared
to their peers (Bastian et al., 2005)22. However, the relationship
between ability EI and positive interpretation, acceptance and
humor is not significant (Bastian et al., 2005)23.
17The terms initial appraisal and reappraisal are used here for conceptual
clarity. In practice, however, it is difficult to distinguish initial appraisal
from reappraisal because appraisals are not a single perception emerging
directly after encountering the potentially stressful situation then stopping.
Rather, appraisals are continuously updated as the situation and one’s own
actions/feelings change over time.
18The authors provided us with subcorrelations between Trait EI and the
“Positive Reinterpretation” subscale of the COPE.
19The authors provided us with subcorrelations between Trait EI and the
“Denial” subscale of the COPE.
20The authors provided us with subcorrelations between Trait EI and the
“positive reappraisal” and “Humour” subscales of the COPE.
21The authors provided us with subcorrelations between Trait EI and the
“Acceptance” subscale of the COPE.
22See footnote 19.
23The authors provided us with subcorrelations between Trait EI and the
“positive reappraisal,” “acceptance,” and “Humour” subscales of the COPE.
EI AND RESPONSE MODULATION
Because high EI people are expected to have achieved their regu-
latory goal (namely, the desired emotional state) through the use
of the four families of strategies reviewed above, we predicted a
negative relationship between trait EI and response-modulation
strategies.
As predicted, there is a negative relationship between EI and
most response modulation strategies, or at least those strategies
whose relationship with EI has been investigated. The only excep-
tion concerns “exercise as a mood-regulation strategy,” which
shows a positive correlation with trait EI (Solanki and Lane,
2010). To the best of our knowledge, no study has yet examined
the relationship between EI and the social sharing of emotions.
We would nevertheless expect a negative relationship between EI
and the number of times a given emotional episode is shared.
Indeed, the more intense the emotion, the greater the extent of
sharing (Rimé, 2009). As high scoring EI people have more (and
more functional) strategies at their disposal to regulate their emo-
tions, we would expect that they would have less need for emotion
sharing. Moreover, we would expect them to better choose the
recipient and moment for sharing; they would thus feel better
listened to, thereby reducing the need for further sharing.
While no study on trait EI and social sharing exists, two studies
have examined the relationship between trait EI and venting (i.e.,
expressing negative feelings, usually one’s anger). Consistent with
our expectations, one study found that higher trait EI participants
were less likely to vent (Zomer, 2012). However, the other study
found no relationship between trait EI and venting (Bastian et al.,
2005)24.
A number of studies have analyzed EI and other response-
modulation strategies such as expressive suppression, aggression,
and substance abuse. As far as expressive suppression is con-
cerned, high trait EI people report suppressing their emotions
less (Totterdell and Holman, 2003; Velasco et al., 2006; Johnson
and Spector, 2007; Mikolajczak et al., 2007b; Austin et al., 2008;
Schutte et al., 2009; Lee and Ok, 2012; Cabello et al., 2013;
although see Kafetsios and Loumakou, 2007 for null findings),
probably because they have already achieved their desired emo-
tional state and/or because they value genuine emotion expres-
sion. Two pieces of evidence support the hypothesis that high trait
EI individuals’ lesser use of suppression is attributable to a lesser
need rather than a lesser capacity. First, although high trait EI
people report making less use of suppression, they do not report
feeling less capable than their low EI peers to use it when required
(Mikolajczak et al., unpublished data). Second, in a study of ser-
vice workers’ emotional labor25, high trait EI employees reported
experiencing less emotional dissonance (i.e., dissonance between
their inner feelings and the feelings required by organizational
display rules) than low EI people. High EI individuals thus needed
to perform reappraisal and suppression less frequently than low
EI individuals (Mikolajczak et al., 2007b).
24The authors provided us with subcorrelations between Trait EI and the
“Venting” subscale of the COPE.
25Emotional labor refers to the act of managing emotions and emotional
expressions in order to be consistent with organizational “display rules,”
defined as the organizationally required emotions during interpersonal service
transactions (Hochschild, 1983).
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As expected, trait EI was also negatively linked to both verbal
and physical aggression (Brackett andMayer, 2003; Shahzad et al.,
2013), suggesting that high EI people can defuse their anger and
frustration through other means. We must draw attention to the
fact that people with high trait EI do not seem to turn their aggres-
siveness against themselves. There is indeed a negative correlation
between trait EI and self-harm (Mikolajczak et al., 2009a), includ-
ing suicidal attempts (Aradilla-Herrero et al., 2014). High EI
people do not therefore need to resort to self-harm to reduce
unwanted emotions.
Finally, trait EI is negatively associated with the consumption
of alcohol (Brackett and Mayer, 2003; Austin et al., 2005; Schutte
et al., 2011; although see Tsaousis and Nikolaou, 2005; Saklofske
et al., 2007; Ghee and Johnson, 2008; Monaci et al., 2013 for null
results), suggesting that high trait EI people do not need alco-
hol to anesthetize their feelings. Moreover, they do not seem to
(ab)use food to regulate their emotions as there is a negative
relationship between trait EI and both Body-Mass Index (Swami
et al., 2010), binge eating (Gardner et al., 2014), and bulimia
(Markey and Vander Wal, 2007; Pettit et al., 2010; Gardner et al.,
2014). It must be noted that the findings on the relationship
between trait EI and the use of cannabis and other drugs are
inconsistent. While some studies have found the expected neg-
ative relationship (Brackett and Mayer, 2003; Riley and Schutte,
2003; Tsaousis and Nikolaou, 2005; Limonero et al., 2006; Rivers
et al., 2013), other studies have found non-significant correlations
(Bastian et al., 200526; Limonero et al., 2006; Saklofske et al., 2007;
Zomer, 2012).
Regarding ability EI, results are more or less consistent with
studies that have used trait measures. There is no significant asso-
ciation between ability EI and venting emotions (Bastian et al.,
2005)27. Subjects with high EI ability display less aggressive behav-
ior (Brackett et al., 2004; Rivers et al., 2013), less suicidal ideation,
fewer suicidal attempts (Karim and Shah, 2014) and are less likely
to use drugs (Trinidad and Johnson, 2002; Brackett and Mayer,
2003; Brackett et al., 2004; Rossen and Kranzler, 2009; Schutte
et al., 2011; Rivers et al., 2013; although see Bastian et al., 200528
for null results). The correlation between ability EI and bulimic
symptoms and binge eating is non-significant (Gardner et al.,
2014).
TOWARD A PROCESS CONCEPTION OF EI
Our review suggests that different levels of EI are associated with
different patterns of emotion regulation use. In particular, high
EI individuals shape their emotion trajectory at the earliest pos-
sible point. This hardly implies that they only expose themselves
to positive situations. Indeed, high EI individuals confront rather
than avoid negative situations if this may lead to more consid-
erable or sustainable long-term benefits (e.g., university exams).
However, when caught in a negative situation, high EI individ-
uals use all possible means to modify the situation and alter its
26The authors provided us with subcorrelations between Trait EI and the
“Alcohol/Drug Use” subscale of the COPE.
27The authors provided us with subcorrelations between Trait EI and the
“Venting” subscale of the COPE.
28See footnote 26.
emotional impact. If possible, they directly attempt to modify the
situation (e.g., study sufficiently in order tomake the examination
less stressful). They also seek and make use of their social sup-
port (e.g., call parents for reassurance or ask a friend to explain to
them a poorly understood subject). If high EI individuals can-
not modify a situation, they are likely to try and transform it
indirectly. For instance, they can achieve this by expressing their
emotions (e.g., telling a professor that they feel stressed in order
to make him or her more compassionate and sensitive). If there
is no way to modify the situation (e.g., if they anticipate that
telling the professor how stressed they are would make him or her
react negatively), high EI individuals distract themselves instead
of ruminating about it. In addition, they strive to remain confi-
dent about their ability to cope with the situation. They also try to
change the way they perceive the situation in order to change how
they feel about it (e.g., thinking that the exam is nothing more
than a test of knowledge and that the stakes are ridiculously low
compared to people risking their lives during the war). Because
high EI individuals are able to alter the trajectory of their emo-
tional experience early on, they do not need to suppress their
behavioral emotional manifestations (e.g., control one’s hand or
voice trembling) or anesthetize their feelings using alcohol, food,
or self-harm.
Because different forms of emotion regulation have diver-
gent outcomes, the consequences of a potentially emotion-eliciting
event should be markedly different for high and low EI peo-
ple. Since high levels of emotional intelligence are associated
with strategies traditionally viewed as adaptive (i.e., generally
associated with decreased subjective experience and peripheral
physiological arousal), high EI individuals are expected to display
less emotional reactivity in response to negative emotion-eliciting
situations.
One approach to examining this issue is using stressful labora-
tory tasks. These situations typically involve a task (e.g., public
speaking, arithmetic) to be performed under stressful condi-
tions (e.g., the presence of an evaluative audience, time pressure).
This paradigm is of interest as it induces negative emotions
but, at the same time, creates implicit pressure toward emo-
tion regulation because performance is impaired by excessive
emotional reactivity. Using a similar paradigm on several occa-
sions, Mikolajczak and colleagues repeatedly found that high EI
individuals displayed lesser emotional reactivity than low EI indi-
viduals. Specifically, compared to low EI participants, high EI
participants displayed less mood deterioration (Mikolajczak et al.,
2007c, 2009b), less emotional intensity, action tendencies, bodily
sensations (Mikolajczak et al., 2007a), and less cortisol secretion
(Mikolajczak et al., 2007c) in response to the stressor. Consistent
with these findings, other researchers have found that high EI
people display less regret after failed negotiations than their low
EI peers (Sevdalis et al., 2007). This higher ego-resiliency has also
been revealed by Schutte et al. (2002). Their study found that
following a negative mood-induction using the Velten method
(sentences meant to provoke a drop in self-esteem), there was a
lesser decrease in positive affect and self-esteem among higher
trait EI individuals than among lower trait EI individuals.
An important question raised by these studies is whether
high trait EI individuals regulate their emotions better than
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their lower counterparts, or whether they are merely less
reactive to affective stimuli/situations in general. The results
of a second type of studies provide preliminary evidence
that trait EI is not associated with uniform lower sensitiv-
ity to affective cues. Rather, it appears to be linked to a
relatively flexible functioning, promoting either increased or
decreased sensitivity to affect-laden stimuli, depending on the
context.
The studies reviewed above examined sensitivity to stress-
ful situations, which, by definition, threaten one’s goals and
integrity, and therefore call for immediate mood regulation. By
contrast, a second kind of studies did not involve any implicit
or explicit pressure toward emotion regulation. These studies
simply presented research participants with neutral, negative
(e.g., sad, anger-eliciting) and/or cheerful (e.g., amusing) video
clips. Contrary to “stress-inducing” studies, the second type of
studies either found no clear moderating effect of EI on imme-
diate reactivity to the videos (Ciarrochi et al., 2001) or found
higher EI scores associated with increased reactivity (Petrides and
Furnham, 2003). These results suggest that EI is actually sensi-
tive to affective cues and leaves room for emotions to emerge.
Nevertheless, these studies also show that high EI individu-
als are more likely to implement efficient regulation strategies
after the negative videos than their low EI peers. Specifically,
Ciarrochi et al. (2001) found a significant moderating effect
of EI on the valence of stories composed following the clips,
suggesting that high EI participants are more able to generate
positive stories in order to maintain a positive mood/repair a neg-
ative mood than low EI people. Likewise, Petrides and Furnham
(2003) found that high EI individuals were more able to use
subsequent cheerful videos to repair their mood than low EI
people.
Taken together, these findings suggest that trait EI is associated
with differences in emotion regulation rather than with differ-
ences in reactivity to emotion-laden stimuli (see also Sevdalis
et al., 2007). Early EI theorists proposed that the salient feature
of “emotionally intelligent regulation” was its flexibility: EI could
not be characterized by a constant regulation resulting in the
absence of emotion. On the contrary, emotionally intelligent indi-
viduals could be quite open to emotions, take advantage of the
information they convey, and efficiently regulate this information
when it became redundant or inappropriate (Mayer and Salovey,
1997). The findings reviewed above are clearly in line with this
conceptualization.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF EMOTIONAL
INTELLIGENCE AND EMOTION REGULATION
In the previous section, we analyzed how EI relates to emotion
regulatory processes and outcomes. It is noteworthy that although
many processes were reviewed, not all emotion-regulation pro-
cesses were mentioned because some processes were not inves-
tigated in relation to EI. Some of the processes awaiting investi-
gation in relation to EI include those pertaining to interpersonal
emotion regulation (see, e.g., Rimé, 2007 for the benefits of the
social sharing of emotions) or to the processing of emotional
information (see, e.g., Philippot et al., 2003 for the benefits of
specificity in emotional information processing). In addition to
highlighting the need to further address these specific issues,
the present review also opens up broad avenues for future
research. In the following sections, we will present several promis-
ing directions, each of which is likely to broaden and extend
our understanding of the relationship between EI and emotion
regulation.
UP-REGULATION vs. DOWN-REGULATION
The studies reviewed above have focused on the down-regulation
of negative emotions, by far the most common target of emo-
tion regulation efforts (Gross et al., 2006). However, although
this is a reasonable starting point, much remains to be done.
As emphasized elsewhere (Gross, 2014), emotion regulation can
occur anywhere in the 2 × 2 matrix formed by crossing neg-
ative and positive emotions with up- and down-regulation.
Consequently, people not only try to decrease negative emo-
tions (Gross et al., 2006), they also try to increase positive ones
(Quoidbach et al., 2010, 2015). On some occasions, they also
strategically increase negative emotions (e.g., anger when collect-
ing debts, Sutton, 1991; anger before engaging in a confronta-
tional task, Tamir et al., 2008; worry and fear when anticipating
a threatening task, Tamir et al., 2007), or decrease positive emo-
tions (e.g., amusement during a serious meeting; Gruber et al.,
2011).
We believe that research on individual differences in emotion
regulation would greatly benefit from integrating research all four
facets of the emotion regulation goals matrix. For instance, are
high EI individuals are as efficient in upregulating negative emo-
tions as in downregulating them? The up- and down-regulation of
positive emotions must also be examined. This kind of research is
especially warranted as it is not obvious, for instance, that EI will
be conductive of efficient down-regulation of positive emotions. It
may well be the case that high trait EI individuals experience dif-
ficulties in down-regulating positive emotions and up-regulating
negative emotions. Studies that delve deeper into these ques-
tions are crucial as this issue has both theoretical and practical
implications.
At the theoretical level, it is important to know whether an
individual can perform at above average levels in each of the
2 × 2 ER matrix cells, or whether the price to pay for above
average down-regulation of negative emotions/up-regulation of
positive emotions is below average up-regulation of negative
emotions/down-regulation of positive emotions. If the latter is
true, EI definitions and theories should be amended accord-
ingly. At the practical level, if measures of trait EI capture
people who are skilled in the down-regulation of negative
emotions/up-regulation of positive emotions but whose down-
regulation of positive emotions/up-regulation of negative emo-
tions is impaired, then those scoring high on EI measures would
not be suitable candidates for positions such as bill collectors,
funeral directors and so on. Research is also needed to under-
stand how EI affects composite instances of emotion regulation.
Indeed, individuals sometimes try to regulate multiple and con-
flicting emotions such as simultaneous feelings of pride about
one’s achievement and sadness/concern about the failure of a
friend, or both joy and guilt when one indulges in some forbidden
pleasure.
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AUTOMATIC vs. EFFORTFUL EMOTION REGULATION
Contemporary dual-process models contrast automatic (also
called implicit or non-conscious) processes with deliberate (also
called explicit, conscious or controlled) processes (e.g., Strack and
Deutsch, 2004). Whereas deliberate processes require attentional
resources, are volitional, conscious, and goal-driven, automatic
processes require neither attention nor intention, occur outside
of awareness, and are stimulus driven.
The notion that relatively high-level self-regulatory processes
such as emotion regulation can be performed automatically may
seem counterintuitive (Bargh, 2004). However, there is ample evi-
dence that the full sequence of goal pursuit—from goal setting
to the completion of the goal—can proceed outside of conscious
awareness. For instance, Bargh et al. (2001) have shown that
priming the goal of achievement led research participants to out-
perform a control group on a variety of tasks, and subliminal
priming of cooperation led participants to make a greater num-
ber of cooperative responses in a “commons dilemma” situation.
Interestingly, participants behaved in line with these goals with-
out knowing why or even that they were acting this way. Even
more remarkable, the outcomes were the same when the goal
was primed and operated outside of awareness as when the goal
was explicitly stated in the task instructions (see Fitzsimons and
Bargh, 2004 for a review).
The few studies that have investigated whether emotion reg-
ulation can also operate automatically have provided preliminary
support for this idea. For instance, Mauss et al. (2007) have shown
that participants primed with emotion control reported less anger
than participants primed with emotion expression following an
anger-induction manipulation.
EI research to date has not sought to determine whether emo-
tion regulation processes displayed by high vs. low EI people are
automatic or effortful. One may be inclined to conclude that
high EI is associated with largely automatic regulation processes.
There are two main arguments in favor of this view. First, as sug-
gested by Bargh and Williams (2007), insofar as an individual
performs emotion regulation routinely and in a relatively con-
sistent manner, this process must follow the principles of skills
acquisition and become progressively more automatic. Second,
and according to the same authors, automatic emotion regulation
processes are much more consistent and reliable than conscious
processes and have the advantage of operating effectively even in
the presence of cognitive load (because automatic processes do
not require attentional resources). Thus, insofar as high EI indi-
viduals are able to regulate their emotions while under a cognitive
load (e.g., preparing a public speech in Mikolajczak et al., 2007c,
or reading sentences in Schutte et al., 2002), one might reason-
ably assume that emotion regulation processes occur somewhat
automatically.
But things may not be quite so simple. As stated above, auto-
matic processes occur outside of awareness and are thus stimulus-
driven, which in the case of emotion regulation means “driven
by emotion.” If regulatory processes were automatically initiated
in response to emotions, this would leave little room for flexi-
bility. Yet we earlier demonstrated that high EI individuals are
rather open to emotions, which they regulate only when these
are deemed problematic in a particular context. In view of this
consideration, we are forced to conclude that high EI individuals’
emotion regulatory processes cannot be fully automatic. Further
research is thus needed to understand which stimuli/contexts give
rise to automatic vs. effortful emotion regulation, as well as the
moment when automatic processes take place (too early in the
case of overly controlled individuals, too late or never in low EI
individuals?).
LONG-TERMMENTAL AND PHYSICAL HEALTH CONSEQUENCES
We have provided some evidence that high EI individuals are
open to emotions and leave room for their emergence. Thus, they
do not always regulate their emotions, but appear to know how
to do so efficiently when necessary. Although findings reported
so far seem to associate EI with the wise utilization of emo-
tion regulation, the ultimate evidence in favor of the adaptive
nature of EI would be to show that it correlates with supe-
rior indicators of adaptation, such as better mental and physical
health.
A recent meta-analysis of the relationships between EI and
health (105 effect sizes, 19,815 participants; by Martins et al.,
2010) showed that EI was positively associated with mental
health (r = 0.36) and self-reported physical health (r = 0.27).
Mikolajczak et al. (in press) recently confirmed the positive asso-
ciation between trait EI and health using objective indicators
of physical health available from participants’ Mutual Benefit
Society records (i.e., doctor consultations, hospitalization, drug
consumption) (r = 0.11). This relationship between trait EI and
physical health is not surprising as mounting evidence suggests
that different emotion regulation strategies exert a distinct influ-
ence on physical health (Gross, 2013). For instance, researchers
found that reappraisal was associated with lower levels of C-
reactivity protein, whereas suppression was associated with higher
levels of C-reactivity protein (Appleton et al., 2013). In another
study, Kubzansky et al. (2011) found that self-regulation (under-
stood as a psychological asset that enables individuals to manage
feelings, thoughts, impulses, and behavior, with the capacity to
regulate emotions serving as a central component) predicted a
decreased subsequent risk of heart attacks and coronary heart dis-
ease in men, even when controlling for traditional coronary risk
factors.
Several other factors may explain this relationship between EI
and physical health. First, if high EI individuals regulate their
emotions at the earliest possible point, they should experience
less prolonged arousal in response to a negative situation/stimuli
and thus be protected vis-à-vis the deleterious consequences
of chronic arousal on physical health (e.g., coronary heart dis-
ease, gastro-intestinal disorders, asthma, psoriasis, migraine etc;
Chrousos, 2000; Thurin and Baumann, 2003). Second, if high EI
people do not need alcohol and drugs to anesthetize unwanted
feelings, they should be consequently less at risk for substance-use
related health problems such as cirrhosis of the liver, pancreatitis,
and polyneuropathy. Third, their increased emotion regulation
efficiency should have a positive effect on their sleep, which is
known to be crucial to health (Belloc and Breslow, 1972; Pilcher
and Ott, 1998; Gottlieb et al., 2006). Brown and Schutte (2006)
indeed showed that higher trait EI is associated with better quality
and more refreshing sleep.
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REGULATION STRATEGIES vs. REGULATION STYLES
Authors in the ER tradition have repeatedly warned against classi-
fying strategies as irremediably (i.e., always) good or bad (Barrett
and Gross, 2001; Gross and Thompson, 2007). They argue that
the efficiency of a strategy depends on the context and the angle
from which we see things (Aldao et al., 2015).
To illustrate, we can take the example of a man who prides
himself on being strong and independent, and thus suppresses his
anger and sadness when his girlfriend confesses that she cheated
on him. The success or value of this strategy depends on the crite-
ria adopted. In this case, his reaction could be deemed successful
with respect to the regulator’s goals (the strategy used allows him
to meet his goal: appearing strong and independent in the eyes of
his girlfriend), with respect to some social norms (i.e., his reaction
is aligned with social norms concerning avoidance of unmanly
reactions such as crying and violent reactions such as hitting),
and with respect to the relationship from a short-term perspec-
tive (the strategy used makes it possible to avoid a fight). This
same strategy could be deemed unsuccessful with respect to the
relationship from a long-term perspective (his girlfriend does not
get a chance to know how hurt he really is. She might therefore
cheat on him again, leading eventually to a breakup), and possi-
bly with respect to the man’s long-term adaptation (by hiding his
emotions, he prevents people from sensing his needs and exposes
himself to further negative emotions, thereby endangering his
long-term well-being and health).
Whereas we believe that it is crucial to understand that a
given emotion regulation strategy cannot be considered as adap-
tive or maladaptive per se—namely, irrespective of the context,
the temporal perspective, and the individual’s goals—this review
nonetheless supports the idea that different emotion regulation
styles (i.e., the repeated use of a given emotion regulation pat-
tern) carry different consequences for longer-term adaptation.
Inasmuch as EI predicts successful adaptation in a number of
domains (e.g., work performance, marital/social relationships),
the fact that it is positively associated with some strategies (e.g.,
problem-focused coping, reappraisal) and negatively with others
(e.g., rumination, substance use) suggests that some regulation
styles are more adaptive than others. This view is consistent with
preliminary empirical evidence obtained in the emotion regu-
lation tradition (e.g., Gross and John, 2003; John and Gross,
2007) and the accumulated evidence in coping research (e.g.,
Zeidner and Endler, 1996) and in other specific domains (e.g.,
Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993 regarding rumination).
REAL-WORLD CONSEQUENCES OF EMOTION REGULATION FAMILIES
The foregoing theoretical consideration suggests that research
in the ER tradition would benefit from delving more deeply
into the investigation of the consequences of different emotion
regulation styles for adaptation. For instance, what are the rel-
ative costs and benefits of each regulation family? Aldao et al.’s
(2010) meta-analysis showed that some ER strategies are most
represented in psychopathological groups, thereby suggesting that
these may be less effective. The meta-analysis carried out byWebb
et al. (2012) nicely complemented these findings by compar-
ing the relative efficiency of the various ER strategies regarding
experimentally-induced emotions. A meta-analysis that could
compare the relative short- and long-term efficiency of ER strate-
gies regarding real-life events is needed to complete the picture,
but the current paper provides a preliminary idea of what the
findings may look like (at least in the long-term perspective).
We further believe that the real-world contexts explored by
EI researchers constitute a crucial testing-ground for the predic-
tions made in the ER tradition. Gross (2002) and Gross and John
(2003) have investigated the social consequences of the use of
reappraisal and suppression but this work should be extended
to other regulation strategies and other domains of life. One
important issue to be addressed concerns the outcomes of differ-
ent emotion regulation styles in family, friendship, educational,
and work settings. For instance, do people who chronically use
reappraisal have better social and marital relationships? Are they
more efficient at work than those who use distraction or emotion
expression? Another issue that needs to be addressed concerns
the nature of the benefits/costs of each regulation style. Indeed,
as we have emphasized above, strategies can be differentially suc-
cessful depending on the criteria adopted (short term vs. long
term, self vs. other vs. the relationship, emotion regulation vs.
task efficiency). Accordingly, it is conceivable that reappraisal and
distraction are equally efficient in decreasing the negative affect
induced by a given task, but that the former is more efficient
than the latter regarding one’s performance of the task. Studies
such as these are needed to determine whether some strategies are
more successful than others in maximizing adaptation in a large
number of domains.
Finally, it is possible that the key to successful adaptation lies
not only in the use of effective strategies but also in the breadth
of one’s ER repertoire and in the flexibility with which one uses
these regulation strategies. Studies are urgently needed to address
strategic flexibility, namely the ability to modify one’s regula-
tion style when it is not appropriate for the situation at hand
(Bonanno et al., 2004; Aldao et al., 2015). Strategic flexibility
seems indeed essential for one’s adaptation to a complex and
changing environment such as ours, in which a usually functional
regulation style can at times turn out to be dysfunctional (e.g.,
the rigid utilization of a usually functional regulation style such as
problem-focused coping can have serious costs in uncontrollable
situations such as an incurable disease).
CONCLUDING COMMENT
In this article, we have drawn together two relatively independent
research traditions that both capture an important aspect of emo-
tion management. The ER tradition has shed light on emotion
regulation processes while the EI tradition has documented the
consequences of individual differences in emotion regulation on
social, health, educational and work outcomes.
The goal of the present paper was to use the ER concep-
tual framework (i.e., the process model of emotion regulation)
to characterize and organize the emotion regulation processes
underlying the construct of emotional intelligence. The benefit
for the EI tradition is an enhanced understanding ofwhy high lev-
els of EI are associated with better outcomes, whereas the benefit
for the ER tradition is a better understanding of the social, health,
educational, and occupational consequences of certain emotion
regulation styles.
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Although much research remains to be done to clarify the rela-
tionship between emotional intelligence and emotion regulation,
the present paper suggests that EI is a useful construct to cap-
ture individual differences in emotion regulation. This probably
explains why trait EI has demonstrated incremental validity to
predict emotion-related processes and outcomes over and above
the five-factor model of personality in many studies (e.g., Petrides
and Furnham, 2003; Petrides et al., 2006a, 2007a; Mikolajczak
et al., 2007a,c). It is our hope that this article will help to bridge
the gap between ER and EI traditions and stimulate research on
individual differences in emotion regulation processes and their
real-world consequences.
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